シンポジウム報告書

日本人論への問い

2006年10月6日

Challenges of Changing Identity in Japan

Symposium Proceedings
October 6, 2006

龍谷大学アフラシア平和開発研究センター

Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Ryukoku University

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
　ロゴは、ガーナ・アディンクラ模様の「双頭のワニ」。双頭のワニは、２つの口がたとえ争っても胃袋はひとつであり、つまり目的は同じなのだから、争わずに協力していこうという意味合いの平和のシンボルであり、アジアとアフリカという２つの地域を合わせて「アフラシア」という圏域（スフィア）を象徴的に示すとともに、他方で同地域における非暴力による紛争解決と平和の実現を目指す本センターの強い願いを示しています。

　The logo mark of Afrasian Centre is adopted from an Adinkra symbol of "Siamese crocodiles" in the ancient kingdom of Asante that existed in what is now the Republic of Ghana, West Africa. It is a popular symbol of peace and unity, as Siamese crocodiles share a stomach, or the same ultimate goal, even if they tend to fight with each other.

PREFACE

The 2006 First Afrasian Symposium, "Challenges of Changing Identity in Japan," was held on October 6, 2006 at the Campus Plaza Kyoto in the Consortium in Universities in Kyoto. We were especially happy to welcome Prof. Harumi Befu (Stanford University) back to Kyoto and have him present a keynote address on "Re-thinking Civil Society in light of Japanese Experience." The talk was a broad introduction to the challenges that Japan faces in an increasingly multicultural and diversifying society and the problems of using universal frameworks of human rights and civil society to analyze change or lack thereof. Such universal frameworks, originating as they have in the historical development of the West, often contain unexplored contradictions when applied in other parts of the world. Prof. Soo-im Lee (Ryukoku University) followed this talk with a comment on some of the issues that the Zainichi Korean community in Japan has been facing in recent times, an account that has been published in a book she co-edited with Prof. Befu (Lee, Murphy-Shigematsu and Befu 2006).

In the second part of the colloquium, Bruce White (Doshisha University) and Julian Chapple (Ryukoku University) offered contrasting perspectives on integration and multiculturalism. White more generally made a positive case for the way that Japanese identities are undergoing change and hybridity based on his research on young Japanese people's relation to alternative music and lifestyles such as reggae and Jawaiian, while Chapple underscored some of the differences and essentialisms based on nationality and citizenship that are yet to be overcome as an aging Japanese society becomes increasingly reliant on immigration as one of the ways to revitalize itself. In his comment on the two papers, Greg Poole (Takachiho University) noted that social science has a role to play in both bottom-up ethnographic (White) and top-down policy (Chapple) types of analysis and it is indeed the strength of social science to be able to address these often contradictory evidence in a way that makes change seem less an inevitability, which it nonetheless *is* in our globalizing world, than a remarkable accomplishment when and where it can be shown to have durable effects.

Taken as a whole, these papers and comments provide a wide variety of perspectives on the dilemmas and challenges of diversity for Japan in the 21st century. It can't be ignored, as White's paper shows, that there are some authentic openings towards multiculturalism in Japan which may be too often ignored by over reliance on critical lenses, especially as non-Japanese can easily document through everyday experience. On the other hand, as Befu points out, the embeddedness of the "hegemony of homogeneity," or the habitus of instilled and 'learned' tradition, as noted by Poole, prevent such openings from gaining broader acceptance. As such, social scientists face a double task in continuing to try to document the small changes in solidarity building across differences, ethnic, gender, class, and within individual identity formation, while at the same time

acknowledging and critiquing the retardant strictures of actors and systems which serve to militate against increased social and transcultural porosity and convivial intercultural conflict resolution.

March, 2008
William Bradley

REFERENCE

Lee, Soo-im, Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu and Harumi Befu, eds. 2006. *Japan's Diversity Dilemmas: Ethnicity, Citizenship, and Education*. New York: iUniverse.

謝辞

CONTENTS

SPECIAL LECTURE

Re-thinking Civil Society in light of Japanese Experience

Harumi Befu

Emeritus Professor, Stanford University

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Concept of Civil Society

In recent years the concept of civil society has become a rising issue in analyzing the contemporary and changing social, cultural as well as political scenes in Japan (e.g., Kingston 2004, Mekata 2003, Schwartz and Pharr 2003, Yamamoto 1999). In this paper I wish to explore the extent to which this concept is applicable and useful in analyzing the Japanese scene as well as the limitation of the concept.

Civil society is often conceived as the social space unoccupied by the state and the market economy. This oft-quoted definition, however, is deficient in that it defines civil society as a residual category, that is, what civil society is *not*; but it does not define what it *is*. Merely designating a "vacant space," so to speak, does not clarify its substance. Civil society should be regarded as a space where individual rights are respected, where "commons" and "public good" are (and should be) recognized, defended, and protected, where citizenship is fully expressed.

To say that civil society occupies the non-state, non-market space may sound as if civil society has no interest in political or economic affairs. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Civil society has a keen interest in political and economic affairs of the society as they affect citizens. "Expression of citizenship" here means exercise of responsibility as citizens to protect individual rights against incursion of external influence into this space by the state or by market forces. In short, civil society as a concept vigilantly guards against intrusion by the state and corporate power to rob citizens of their rights and freedom.

1.2 "Universality" of Civil Society

At once we need to acknowledge the fact that the concept was born in the context of the Western civilization and was "exported" or "imported," as the case may be, to Japan and elsewhere for political purposes. An assumption that accompanies this "exportation/importation" is that civil society is a "universally applicable" concept. However, the concept of "universality" is ambiguous and problematic and needs clarification. In one sense, "universality" means "true" or "valid" in all space-time coordinates, that is, in all parts of the globe — past, present, and future. This is the sense in which mathematical theorems are said to have universal validity, but also in which Christianity preaches "universal love." However, it is quite obvious that Christian love, in as much as it is a product of a specific religion, could not be "universal" in the sense defined here. Nor can "civil society," or the concept of "human rights" which is so central to the civil society concept

and declared by the United Nations to be "universal." But these concepts were born in the context of the Western civilization, especially in the Enlightenment context. The United Nations itself was established basically by Western powers, and its ideology as expressed in its preamble as well as its organization is based on Western political theory.

Thus a more appropriate comprehension of "universality" as commonly used by Western scholars and human rights workers is that these concepts may be applicable without any problem within the context of Western or Christian civilization since the Enlightenment. As Dembour, referring to the concept of human rights, puts it:

> [I]t is also important to realize that human rights do not make sense outside the specific political and social history from which they have evolved, which can be summarized as the struggle to check the arbitrariness of the modern state. (Dembour 2001: 58)

In fact, as early as 1947, according to Sally Engle Merry, the American Anthropological Association submitted a statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights objecting to the proposed Universal Declaration on Human Rights, stating: "how can the proposed Declaration be applicable to all human beings, and not be a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in the countries of Western Europe and America?" (Merry 2001: 33)

In 1999, however, the American Anthropological Association issued a "Declaration of Anthropology and Human Rights," in which it retreated to the position of assuming the Western conception of rights, a position based on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. This position is echoed by Robert Albro, who wrote in 2007 in an article published in *Anthropology News*, an official organ of the American Anthropological Association, in which he endorses the human rights instruments of the United Nations, UNESCO, and the International Labor Organization.

A second important observation is that civil society is an advocacy concept. Most social science concepts, such as "family," "society," "socio-economic status" and "institution," are ostensibly "objective," and do not advocate any particular value, not obviously, anyway. Civil society, on the other hand, advocates guarding, if not expanding, individual rights vis-à-vis formal political and economic institutions.

By this understanding of the concept, the former Soviet Union's political institution destroyed public commons and obliterated civil societal space. Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, have co-opted, rather than destroyed, the public commons by expanding the state's role to include social welfare and other public interest programs. Thus the relationship between civil society and political and economic institutions is clearly variable. In general, one may say that civil society as a libertarian concept is inimical to totalitarianism.

The concept of civil society as developed in the West presumes a well developed notion of

the individual citizen. In fact in the history of the West, this notion of citizenship played a critical role when political and economic institutions played a relatively minor role. In the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries, however, these institutions have expanded enormously, what with the development of socialist states and capitalist economies, thereby ever constricting the space for civil society, both institutions claiming the space in past reserved for civil society.

2 "UPROOTING" AND "TRANSPLANTING" CIVIL SOCIETY CONCEPT
2.1 Disjuncture of Western "Universality"

Even though the concept may not be absolutely "universal" in the sense of being true regardless of space-time coordinates, as long as the concept is applied in the West, the application is more or less valid. To the extent that Westerners, imbued with Christian cosmology and Enlightenment ideology, *believe* that civil society, human rights, the individual, citizenship, and the like are universally true, and nearly everyone agrees upon this myth, in the minds of the Westerners these concepts can act as though they are valid as applied in the context of Western civilization. The tendency, however, is for Westerners to assume mistakenly, the "universal truth" of Western concepts, including the concept of civil society, to be applicable in any part of the world, if not throughout history, and attempt to apply them to the non-Western world as if they have transcendent reason to be applicable to any non-Western part of the world. Such an assumption privileges these Western concepts over local concepts, which are denigrated as "native," "particular" or "locally limited" as if non-Western values are less desirable. But when these concepts imbued with Enlightenment assumptions and humanist ideologies are uprooted and imported to a cultural environment, such as Japan, which does not share the same cosmology and ideology, we have a problem. For example, editors of *Culture and Rights* state at the very beginning of the volume:

> This volume adds an anthropological perspective to the debate: we argue for the need of a forum in which theoretical explorations of rights, citizenship and related concepts can engage with empirical contextual studies of rights processes. This is important because local concerns continue to shape how universal categories of rights are implemented resisted and transformed. (Cowan, Dembour and Wilson 2001: 1)

Here one sees that "universal" in the sense of time-space coordinate-free is equated with "universal" in the West. Dembour is right in applying such an assumption outside the West as "arrogance." In her words, "An approach convinced of the righteousness of human rights standards must ultimately lead to arrogance because it excludes the experience of the 'other' " (Dembour 2001: 58). It is crucial to note well that civil society, human rights, and so forth, are a project of modernity and that modernity itself is a project of the post-Enlightenment West. Imposition of these concepts to non-Western regions of the world privileges the West with the hegemonic role and power to

define Western values for ruling over the non-Western world, and *mutatis mutandis*, relegates non-Western values in such settings as secondary to Western values.

2.2 Tokugawa Legacy

In applying the civil society concept to Japan, we should be mindful of the legacy of the Tokugawa polity, where at least in theory, the ruling class of samurai held absolute power over other classes of people. This absolute power meant, in civil society terms, that the "residual" left by the political institution was, in theory at least, zero. There was no room in theory for the growth of civil society. Of late Ikegami (2005) has argued that a form of civility did develop in Edo period. But as she herself notes, this was not the same as civil society as we know it now. This was due to the fact that in theory the state was able to exercise power over all sectors of social life and retained the right to do so, while in fact, it left much of the private areas untouched by power. Ikegami puts it this way:

> Civil society implies a domain of private citizens that has a certain degree of autonomy from the state. The empowerment of civil society has been closely associated with the historical development of modern democracy. By contrast, Tokugawa Japan experienced the emergence of a form of civility that flourished within a new-feudal political structure. Under the firm hand of the Tokugawa shoguns, Japan did not develop a civic associational domain that fit the Western notion of civil society. (Ikegami 2005: 19)

This legacy of theoretically absolute control continued into the modern Meiji and subsequent periods, during which time there was little protection for people, who were subjects (*kokumin* or *shinnmin*), whose life is at the mercy of the sovereign. They were not citizens (*shimin*), who have inherent rights as individuals. Thus they were at the mercy of the ultimate authority or sovereignty of the nation. Civil society as such was very ill developed in prewar modern Japan.

In the postwar constitution, rights of the individual were guaranteed, but constitutionally guaranteed rights were not always respected even by the court, let alone the society at large. The Tokugawa legacy meant that the government continued to maintain the tendency to consider it its assumed right to encroach on areas of privacy. Both the society (public opinion) and the judiciary have preferred to honor the legacy in which civil society was often ignored, though with passage of time, individual rights have been more and more recognized. How vulnerable the private sector is saliently exemplified in "administrative guidance," (McVeigh 2004: 90-93) in which a government office issues directives to schools, commercial institutions or private organizations to request compliance in certain areas. Such directives are not legally binding, and normally have no penal consequences. But it is well understood that it is foolish to brazenly ignore such guidance, for the government can and often does retaliate indirectly, e.g., by not readily offering favors that it might

otherwise be willing to do. It is thus that the government intrudes upon the space formally reserved for the private sector.

2.3 Japan as Multi-ethnic

The fact that Japan is no longer, if ever, a mono-ethnic society has been demonstrated in recent years by a number of scholars (Denoon et al. eds. 1996, Lie 2001, Goodman et al. eds. 2003, Weiner ed. 1997) and needs no elaboration. Thus in applying the concept of civil society to Japan, one may think of two categories of people to whom it may be applied. One is the ethnic Japanese themselves and naturalized Japanese. The other is foreigners who number upwards of one percent of Japan's total population, and this number has been increasing in the last two decades, in spite of the recession in the long lost decade since 1989, and attendant civil societal problems associated with accommodating them are also increasing.

My interest in this paper is in the latter category of people, but I shall refer to the ethnic Japanese situation as well in relation to the burakumin.

2.4 Foreigners and Human Rights — NGOs and NPOs

The Japanese government may seem inimical to foreign residents. But we must not unilaterally say that foreigners are not eligible to receive social services from the government. For example, they are entitled to participate in the national pension system (*kokumin nenkin*) and the national health insurance (*kokumin kenkoo hoken*). However, as for the welfare system (*seikatsu hogo hoo*), foreigners do not have the legal right to claim welfare because this entitlement is by law limited to *kokumin* (Japanese nationals); but local governments are allowed to provide welfare to them, not as a right, but as administrative consideration (Sato 1992: 101).

One of the hallmarks of civil society is the presence of voluntary organizations which carry out numerous projects not encumbered by the state. In Japan the 1995 Kobe earthquake triggered mushrooming of innumerable volunteer group.[1] In response, the government instituted the NPO Law to certify NGOs, giving them an official status. NGOs are volunteer groups which have no legal status. They are groups of citizens sharing certain common interest to put into action. NGOs can apply to the government and receive an NPO status. By being approved to be an NPO, the organization gains prestige — much more than it might in the West. Also, this legitimation by the government makes it easier to raise funds since people tend to believe that a government-approved organization is trustworthy. NPOs are more likely to receive government funding through outright

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[1] Prior to 1995, numerous NGOs did exist in Japan, a fact which is often forgotten in the discussion on the history of NGOs. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, when Japan's rapid economic growth was executed at the expense of the welfare of the people and the environment, citizens organized themselves to combat corporate greed and state irresponsibility. Typically they carried a name ending in "….o kangaeru kai" (Group to think about ….). These NGOs gradually declined in activities and decreased in numbers as the state and corporations began to take measures to ameliorate adverse conditions.

grants or receive government contracts. It also makes it easier for an NPO to carry out its mission since people tend to trust its activities to be genuine and authentic. Thus an NGO has much to gain to be a government-approved NPO. However, the application process is cumbersome, and requires among others a statement of the purpose for the organization's existence. Also, NPOs are required to submit an annual report. Obviously, these are the methods by which the government keeps control on NPOs. An organization which is trying to support illegal aliens, to promote their welfare, to carry on activities which are contrary to the stated or unstated goals of the government is not likely to receive approval if it applied for the NPO status.

For example, Rafiq is an NGO which supports aliens applying for the refugee status as well as refugees in Japan. While the law does provide means for applying for the refugee status, the strong tendency of the Japanese government is to deny refugee status to applicants and to deport them. Thus Rafiq is not likely to receive fair hearing even if it applied for an NPO status. Most of the NGOs supporting foreign workers are engaged in activities which are in one way or another contrary to government goals and wishes. Thus few of them are approved as NPOs.

Checking a list of NPOs in the internet, I can only identify two which support foreigners out of a list of 190: Bridge, located in Nagano Prefecture, which provides medical examination and diagnosis, and NPO Frontier Toyohashi, which collects data on Nikkei Latins.[2] Neither of these two is engaged in controversial activities which the government might find questionable, which is probably the reason why they were able to obtain the NPO status. NGOs supporting foreigners tend to have meager financial base, have few if any paid staff, and depend heavily on volunteers. One may say thus that NGOs which are not government-approved (which include most of those supporting foreigners) express the true spirit of the civil society, whereas NPOs in Japan are NGOs turned handmaidens of the government.

Herein lies the murky zone between the state and civil society. An NGO which does not apply for the NPO status may be engaged in the same or similar activities as an NPO. One is totally private while the other is quasi-public. It is important to realize that the border zone between the state and non-state is not as clear-cut as one might imagine.

3 HUMAN RIGHTS AS APPLIED TO JAPAN
3.1 Human Rights for the Japanese

Human rights in Japan have been interpreted to apply to *kokumin* — namely those who legally hold Japanese nationality (*kokuseki*). The word "people" in the original English draft of the constitution was translated as "*kokumin*" rather than a generic "universal" term, such as "*ningen*," "*hito,*" or "*hito-bito*." This translation, *kokumin*, shut out foreigners from many entitlements in the Japanese legal system. The notion of human rights was imported from the West along with the

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[2] http://www.npo-jp.net/

postwar constitution but had a slow start. Nonetheless, it made its headway since such rights were guaranteed in the constitution, which made it easier to make a public issue of them, not to say that making an issue always yielded successful results. Also, regardless of the constitutional base, the idea of human rights (*jinken*) earned currency in Japanese popular thinking as a tool or weapon to fight unlawful discrimination. This is best illustrated in the anti-discrimination movement among the buraku people. In this case, it is important to recognize that while origins of the concept of human rights are definitely to be sought in the West, its developments are largely autochthonous.

The concept of individual rights (*jinken*) has been invoked by the buraku activists and their organizations to their advantage (Davis 2001). The term *jinken* is openly used in their literature, brochures, posters, etc. It is in fact one of the most important terms in the vocabulary of the buraku liberation movement. However, as we shall see, application of the same term/concept (*jinken*) in reference to foreigners has a totally different tone, and has a hard time being accepted by the Japanese. Thus the concept which was imported to Japan presumably with "universal" application now in Japan has an ethnically restricted application. In short, human rights as applied to burakumin and that applied to foreigners are different concepts. One might label them HR1 and HR2.

This is seen, for example, in *Jinken Nenkan* (Year Book on Human Rights). Its 2004 edition, as its earlier editions, starts with a review of human rights (=anti-discrimination) activities in different areas, such as women, children, the aged, Okinawans, the Ainu, Koreans in Japan, other foreign workers, etc. But they are each taken up separately, rather than seeing them under human rights as an integrating umbrella concept, and relating these topics to one another in terms of human rights. Moreover, all subsequent chapters are devoted solely to different aspects of buraku problems, where other discriminated groups are summarily forgotten. Thus while those involved in buraku issues are aware of the umbrella concept of human rights, nonetheless, in discussing different issues of the buraku, they are not integrated with issues of other groups such as Koreans, or other foreigners.

3.2 Human Rights for Foreigners

For example, in discussing how to live with foreign workers and their families, the concept of *kyoosei* ("living together"), is paramount. But in buraku discussion, *kyoosei* is seldom if ever an issue. In fact, in another journal dedicated to buraku problems, *Jinken to Buraku Mondai* (Human Rights and Buraku Problems), Tadasu Murahashi criticizes a school text *Ningen* dedicated to anti-discrimination[3] for making reference to the concept of *kyoosei*. He states: "Solution to

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[3] This text was widely accepted in the buraku educational community, as reported by a study group on the contents and uses of this text in the 1989 edition of *Buraku Kaihoo Jinken Nenkan* (predecessor to *Jinken Nenkan* cited above). See "Dai 24 kai Ningen Jissen Kenkyuu Shuukai" in *Buraku Kaihoo Jinken Nenkan* (Buraku Kaiho Jinken Kenkyusho 1989: 262-267).

buraku problems does not result from considering *kyoosei*. For buraku problem is not predicated on 'difference' [as foreigners' problems are]" (my translation) (Murahashi 2004: 22). Thus while in considering human rights of foreigners in Japan, *kyoosei* ("living together") is a central issue, for buraku activists, this concept is useless, as they do not recognize any difference from other Japanese. *Kyoosei* implies fundamental differences between the Japanese and foreigners, and the goal of *kyoosei* is "living together in spite of differences." To buraku activists, it is not *kyoosei*, but *doowa* ("sameness in harmony") which is the critical concept whereas the *doowa* concept is never invoked in relation to foreigners in Japan. It is exclusively and specifically a concept which comes alive in buraku issues. Related to this is the fact that specific civil societal problems of buraku are unique to the buraku, arising out of its unique historical circumstances not shared by foreigners. It is significant that in the human rights discussion in relation to buraku, UN treaties and conventions are hardly if ever mentioned. Human rights are treated as a totally domestic and domesticated issue. Human rights in relation to foreign workers and their families, on the other hand, are virtually always treated as human rights issues deriving their rationale from UN treaties and conventions. Herein lies a disconnection between buraku issues as an ethnic Japanese problem and foreigners' issues as a human rights problem.

In short, Japan has managed to "nativize" what was a "universal" concept, and turned it into a particularized concept applicable to Japanese only.

In short, human rights (HR1) as an advocacy concept for the burakumin, who are Japanese, do not apply to foreign residents. What is the basis of this discriminatory application of the concept which in the West is purported to be "universally applicable"? What is the reason why this once "universal" concept became in Japan a "particular" concept reserved only for the Japanese, or the ethnic Japanese?

3.3 Particularization of the Human Rights Concept

The reason for this "particularization" of human rights is that the Japanese conception of humanity distinguishes between themselves and others, best summarized in the Nihonjinron literature (Befu 2001). This distinction is distilled in the concept of "habitus of homogeneity," borrowing the term *habitus* from Bourdieu (1984), which refers to conscious and unconscious disposition for the individual to think and act according to certain cultural dictates. The uniqueness of the Japanese is argued in Nihonjinron in a variety of ways. For example, the Japanese are supposed to be readily distinguishable from non-Japanese in physical characteristics.[4] Some physical anthropologists have resorted to anthropometric and genetic measurements to demonstrate biological continuity of the Japanese from prehistoric times, and by implication their distinction

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[4] Distinguishing them from the Chinese or Koreans is well nigh impossible, although some Japanese do claim that they are able to discriminate Japanese from other East Asians. No rigorous test has demonstrated this claim, however.

from neighboring groups, such as Koreans and Chinese (Hanihara 1995). In the area of cultural uniqueness, many different kinds of argument abound. For example, Japanese language, which obviously is unique, is argued to be a basis of their uniqueness in thinking patterns (Nakamura 1965). More specific patterns of behavior are also invoked for "proving" Japanese uniqueness. Typically the Japanese propensity toward affective dependency (*amae*) (Doi 1973) and toward small group orientation with vertical structure (Nakane 1970) is cited in this respect.

In other words, double assumptions are being made, on the one hand, that the ethnic Japanese are qualitatively different from others and, on the other, that internally they are homogeneous enough in genetic and cultural respects to share certain quintessentially Japanese features. The criteria of distinction such as those discussed above, are ill-understood and ill-defined, but for most Japanese these criteria are nonetheless salient enough in their minds to be readily invoked. These features more often than not enjoy demonstration or endorsement by those with scholarly credentials to make them appear legitimate.[5] The fundamental ideological implication of these assumptions is that Japan belongs to, and should belong to the ethnic Japanese and the ethnic Japanese alone.

In this conception of the world, the Japanese are separated from the rest of the humanity. Human rights, imported from the West, have been invoked in Japan, but are thought to apply only to the Japanese humanity as defined by such criteria as those given above. When the Japanese, at least those who believe in the uniqueness of the Japanese, encounter non-Japanese, the typical reaction is that of exclusion or rejection. When a foreigner, especially of darker skin, asks to rent an apartment, a Japanese landlord is likely to summarily refuse — "We do not rent to foreigners" — often without giving any explanation; or if s/he does explain, it is based on stereotyping foreigners, such as: "foreigners do not keep the apartment clean" or "foreigners don't observe rules about recycling waste material." When a foreigner, especially those of darker skin, applies for a job, the Japanese employer's response often is "we do not hire foreigners" without explanation. These reactions are automatic and unthinking. I call this disposition "habitus of exclusion," which is derived from habitus of homogeneity.

If a foreigner cannot have a job and cannot rent an abode, s/he cannot live in Japan, and is forced to leave the country, which in the end accomplishes the goal of those who believe Japan is for the Japanese alone.

3.4 HR2 (Human Rights 2)

There is a strong tendency for activists supporting foreign workers to invoke human rights to indict the Japanese government and the Japanese society for violations of human rights. For example, in a work on foreign workers' welfare and human rights edited by Sato Susumu (1992),

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[5] But one may entertain the hypothesis that scholars themselves are legitimating ideas that are widely pervasive in the undercurrent of the society.

authors all discuss human rights in Japan as well as elsewhere, mostly as based on UN or ILO treaties and conventions on human rights, often irrespective of whether Japan has signed on to them, as if UN treaties and conventions are enough to require compliance by Japan. Their indictment may make the reader aware that Japan is lagging behind in the "international" (read "Western") standards; but the Japanese government has no legal obligation to comply, unless it is signatory of these agreements. When international treaties, agreements, and conventions are adopted by the Japanese government, the Japanese constitution requires adjustment of domestic law in line with the international agreement (Sato 1992: 97). Yet, Sato says with regards ILO treaties and recommendations, "Japan's extremely narrow interpretations of them and in certain sense, their avoidance are very problematic" (my translation) (Sato 1992: 96-97). Such narrow interpretations result from habitus of homogeneity and attendant "habitus of exclusion."

At the same time, it is not true that the Japanese government is consistently against admitting foreigners to Japan or giving them rights given to the Japanese. For example, the Labor Standards Law does not specify its applicability only to the Japanese nationals. Foreign workers as well, including illegals, are entitled to fair treatment under the law. For example, an illegal (overstay) is entitled to fair compensation for their work, even though s/he may be staying in Japan illegally, in spite of the fact that Japanese employers often feign ignorance and argue they need not pay illegals because they are illegals (Miyajima 1993: 71). Similarly the national pension system does not explicitly exclude foreigners, and they are entitled to subscribe to it. On the other hand, that exclusionary idea takes precedence over human rights consideration is seen in the directive from the Ministry of Labor, which directs prefectural labor offices and governors to report illegal workers rather than keep confidentiality of their illegal status and try to assist them. In the meantime, in 1988 the Ministry of Justice established an office for human rights for foreigners in its Human Rights Bureau. Thus on the one hand, the government favored arresting and deporting illegal workers according to the Labor Ministry, on the other hand, the Justice Ministry is ready to consider foreign workers' human rights (Kaneko 1992: 198-202). Herein lies ambivalence on the part of the Japanese government with regards treatment of foreigners. Thus we see three different positions the government takes regarding accommodating foreigners. One is an explicit exclusion resulting from the fact that the provision specifies *kokumin* (Japanese, legally defined) as its beneficiaries. Second, the government specifically provides services for foreigners, as in the Ministry of Justice provisions. Third, a ministry's defaulting of any specific provision to discriminate against foreigners, e.g., national pension system, at least in theory, allows them to enjoy rights equivalent to the Japanese, although in concrete practices, as I have shown, habitus of homogeneity interferes with this equity.

I should add a proviso that not all Japanese subscribe to this definition of the Japanese as specified in the Nihonjinron literature, nor do they all subscribe to habitus of exclusion. Results of the questionnaire survey conducted in 1987 in the city of Nishinomiya shows that a good deal

less than 100 percent of the sample adheres to the Nihonjinron conception of the Japaneseness (Manabe, Befu and McConnell 1989). In this questionnaire, we asked, among others, what the respondents thought the criteria of being Japanese to be. Results are shown below in percentages.

Table 1

1	Japanese citizenship (*kokuseki*)	47.9%
2	Both parents are Japanese	24.8%
3	Born in Japan	13.8%
4	Raised in Japan in formative years	15.5%
5	Able to speak Japanese	36.9%
6	Possess a Japanese name	26.3%
7	Have Japanese appearance	15.5%

Source: Data from Manabe, Befu and McConnell 1989.

Thus only a relatively small percentage of respondents could identify absolute criteria for being Japanese. Nonetheless, these criteria show what Japaneseness consist of. In short, we should not believe that even given the habitus, not all Japanese will react xenophobically toward foreigners. Still, this habitus plays an important role vis-à-vis foreigners in Japan. Consider a foreigner who goes to a ward office to apply for naturalization. This is based on an actual case. A certain Ms. Kim went to the section of the ward office for foreigners and foreign registration and requested the application form for naturalization. The staff asked who was applying.

> Her answer: "Myself, alone."
> Officer: "You cannot be naturalized alone. Your whole family has to apply. Your father has to be the applicant."

The staff would not even give her the application form. Now, there is no such rule that a family as a unit must apply for naturalization, or that an individual cannot apply alone. This was a made-up rule.

Activist Mamoru Tsukada supporting foreign workers states:

> Government officials do not even observe laws. For example, [while foreign workers are eligible for the national health insurance program] city office staff would tell them "Since you work for a company, you should go to your employer to get the insurance." Or, for international marriage, they would say to the Japanese marrying a foreigner "Unless you have this person's passport, we cannot accept [your marriage registration]." They

don't even know the law they are supposed to enforce. They simply exclude them…
They don't know the law, and without studying it, they would say, "No." That's how
the city office is, and so are the police. The Immigration Office, too, would deny visas.
Especially bad is the Nagoya Immigration Office.

> I asked: "Why can't you approve the visa for this person?"
> Staff: "The signature is different [from the one on the passport]."
> I asked: "How is it different?"

> The two are of course different because they are both hand-written… But they use this as
> the excuse for denying the visa. They don't have any notion of human rights. They don't
> think "How can I help this person?" Instead, I feel they are asking "How can I exclude
> this person?" (Author's translation) (Tsukada 2001: 174)

The xenophobic practice to exclude foreigners is seen in the case of Mr. Aoyagi (Tsukada 2001: 176-179), who in 1993 was helping an illegal Peruvian resident to find a job when Aoyagi was arrested for "aiding an illegal foreigner." Mr. Aoyagi claimed that he as a Catholic was doing it on humanitarian grounds. He told reporters that Peru accepted thousands of Japanese immigrants; this time we should help them. This particular statute prohibiting aiding illegal aliens is accompanied by a proviso that this statute should be applied with caution because it was drafted to prevent exploitation of foreign workers by underworld gangs and abusive employers. But the police claimed Mr. Aoyagi was nonetheless committing a crime for aiding an illegal alien. What one sees here is habitus of exclusion at work — propensity of the police to exclude foreigners, if at all possible. Tsukada laments that what is respected is law, and not human rights.

In this respect Ministry of Justice staff engage in narrow interpretation of the law to exclude foreigners and ignore human rights. The media also collaborates with this tendency by portraying foreigners as prone to crime: foreigners (=criminals) should go home. This mode of thinking is based on or is an extension of the assumption that Japan is for ethnic Japanese (Kanegae 2001: 122-123).

The office staff whom a foreigner normally interacts with hold the lowliest position in the office, and most likely have not had any formal legal training, but are told simply to follow prescribed rules. However, most cases are not straight forward and do not fit rules. Exceptional situations abound where the staff must interpret the rules or the law without proper training. In such a case, the staff is likely to react at the gut level, based on his/her "common sense," which is likely the habitus of homogeneity, which exhorts the staff to exclude foreigners if at all possible. In such a circumstance, the staff are likely to "raise the hurdle" for foreigners to obtain entitlements.

In spite of such difficulty, activists supporting foreigners, especially foreign workers including

illegal ones, and refugee applicants and refugees, latch on to human rights as the principal weapon to fight against mistreatment against foreigners. Currently there are some 200 NGOs according to Shipper (2001) which are supporting them.

CONCLUSION

In considering Japan's civil society, several issues are paramount. We have seen that the concept of human rights, so important in civil society, is actually two distinct concepts, one applying to the burakumin and other Japanese, and the other to foreigners, mostly recent immigrants from different regions of Asia and Latin America. The human rights needs of these two categories of people are so different that I called them HR1 and HR2. Most importantly, burakumin want to be recognized as ordinary Japanese just like all other Japanese. There should be no distinction between them. Immigrants, on the other hand, wish to be recognized as having their own distinct cultural identity and yet not be discriminated on the grounds of the very cultural differences by which they wish to be recognized. The Japanese readily accept the use of the human rights concept (HR1) to apply to other Japanese (burakumin), but they are reluctant to allow foreign immigrants to take advantage of the concept (HR2).

Behind this distinction is the ideology of Nihonjinron, namely belief in the uniqueness of the Japanese and the belief that Japan as a physical entity rightfully belongs only to the Japanese; others are in Japan only on sufferance. This xenophobic attitude is best expressed in what I called habitus of homogeneity, which implies habitus of exclusion, that is, an automatic reaction to exclude foreigners. However, given the fact that not all Japanese subscribe to the Nihonjinron definition of the Japanese, we should be aware that not all Japanese react to foreigners with habitus of exclusion. Many, though definitely a small minority, are quite willing to include foreign immigrants, and live together (*kyoosei*). However, this concept of *kyoosei* is not as articulated as a tradition-honored ideology of Nihonjinron. It is not a mainstream ideology. Foreign observers are prone to criticize the Japanese for their exclusionary attitude; but we must also acknowledge that some Japanese maintain an inclusionary position.

As some Japanese are prone to exclude foreigners and others, include them, the government position is ambivalent. Some legislation explicitly exclude foreigners, in as much as they are not *kokumin*, that is, legally Japanese, which means having *koseki* registration at a government office. Some legislation include foreigners by default. That is to say, insofar as these statutes do not explicitly exclude foreigners, they are entitled to the same rights as the Japanese. Third, some legislation specifically address foreigners' issues, as we noted with respect to the human rights bureau of the Justice Ministry. Thus the government takes an inclusionary approach in some cases and an exclusionary approach in others. Some activists are prone to criticize the Japanese government for its exclusionary legislations. They are right at times. But when the entire

government is examined, as some Japanese are exclusionary and some are inclusionary, one should recognize that it is not always exclusionary.

To summarize various positions with regards civil society, and how it is actualized in Japan, it may be helpful to think of the following three-by-two table.

Table 2

	Government position	Japanese individuals
Ethnic Japanese	A	B
Legal Japanese	C	D
Foreigners	E	F

The government as an institution acts on the basis of the statutes it has enacted. If a person is legally Japanese (=*kokumin*), it protects them according to the law, whether the person is a native-born Japanese (A) or an ethnic Korean who became Japanese (*kokumin*) through naturalization (C). The line of distinction seems clear-cut. However, law is executed and administered by live persons. As seen above, such executors and administrators of law often do not have proper training to interpret the law, and end up relying on his or her habitus of homogeneity/exclusion for interpretation based on the foreigner's appearance and cultural accoutrement. Thus the line between ethnic Japanese (A) and legal Japanese (C) and legal foreigners (E) in actual practice becomes rather murky. Similarly, individual Japanese would most likely treat those who look like and act like a Japanese (including for example, a Japan-born Korean) as a fellow Japanese, even thought the person may be a foreigner. At the same time, the same Japanese would treat, say an American who became a naturalized Japanese, not as a fellow Japanese, but as a foreigner. Thus the border between (B), (D), and (F) is also a murky one.

These considerations give pause to facile application of the concept of civil society, which after all encompasses human rights, anti-discrimination, and "universality" of the concept, and enjoins against discrimination of foreigners. For often we don't know who the Japanese are and who are the foreigners. At the same time, we should not altogether give up the use of the concept as a tool for creating a more equitable Japanese society.

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PANEL DISCUSSION

Reassembling the Cultural-Historical World Map:
Reggae, Pacific Islands Music and the Role of Popular Culture in the Construction of New Global Identities in Japan

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What I am going to be looking at today is essentially a group of people that I feel are integrating cultural pluralism – looking beyond the idea of the nation state, and the east-west divide and coming up with new ideas and new approaches to seeing themselves located in the world.

Now one of the ways in which we can look at this is by using the idea of cultural-historical world maps, or ideas that we have about where we are located, the nature of the universe, the way that the world is constructed and so on. I would like to propose a world map that I'll come back to at the end and explain a little bit more.

This is a world map which celebrates cultural diversity and places diversity as central to an identity – a more global identity which looks beyond the cultural differences, racial differences that we all have. I was interested to hear Professor Lee talk about the *Kenkanryu* because I am actually looking at that as well for a different research project, and it's very interesting to look at something quite as scary as that and contrast it with this sort of community which I'm looking at, which is the reggae community and the mainstream Hawaiian music community, or 'Jawaiian' music community. Jawaiian is a mix of Hawaiian, Japanese and Jamaican, put into one word – 'Jawaiian'.

I am going to talk about two ethnographic snapshots, two very different types of scene, in Japan's popular culture scene. They are very closely related, but they are very different in one important way and that is that the Def Tech group, which many of you may have heard of, and are familiar with, is a very mainstream group. Def Tech music is a feel-good kind of music, played in public places, supermarkets for instance. I will play you a sample right now. Some of you may recognize it if you have been walking around department stores and supermarkets because it is played quite often. I am going to play this song: "Catch the Wave", which is pretty popular. (Musical interlude)

I wanted to give you a taste of the mainstream feel of the music. The song that I wanted to play, which is called "My Way", is actually about expressing oneself in the most forthright, honest way possible.

When you hear some of the Def Tech music, the main kind of theme is basically self-expression, or the importance of it. First, I would like to concentrate more on some of the roots of what I see as the Def Tech sound. These come from the Japanese reggae scene which is a much more underground scene than the very popularized mainstream Def Tech kind of sound. I spent a

few months last year doing some ethnographic research among the Japanese reggae fans. One of my main informants was a guy called Ken.

Ken is in his mid-thirties. He is a care worker – he works in an old people's home. A lot of the reggae fans tend to be in their late twenties or thirties, and have jobs that are not conventional. They are not necessarily 'salary-men'. Ken has been a reggae fan since he was in his early twenties. A lot of what he says about the worldview that he has is linked to the way that Japan has imported reggae and along with it the Rastafarian culture and religion that it embodies.

Ken will talk about the importance of nature, of the environment, of being responsible, of taking responsibility for one's actions, of not working so hard in one's life – not joining the rat-race – of living in a world that is both responsible for its own actions but also caring of others and caring for the environment. These kinds of messages are embodied in the music that he loves and come from the Rastafarianism ideology.

Ken took me to various places. For example, he took me to a club in Kawasaki where a live show was taking place. The live show – this was an incredible audience – must have been about 3,000-4,000 people. It is not my kind of music, to be honest. I dropped that project to favor the Def Tech kind of look. You can see from the messages that are pumping out from the roots of the Def Tech kind of music – a real celebration of cultural pluralism. This kind of cultural pluralism is not just about celebrating international artists that come to the stage. International artists are celebrated alongside people from Okinawa from Sapporo – in fact, Okinawa and Sapporo almost have more status than Miami, Jamaica, Kingston – all of which were performing at this particular event.

A lot of interesting musical styles mixed into one, a big celebration of cultural diversity. However, not for the sake of cultural diversity, a sense of cultural diversity being something that we all share and that's something that brings us all together here right now. That was certainly my interpretation of the atmosphere of the place. The next event that I went to see was the next day actually, and pretty hard going. But there were a series of acts outside – it was held in Kanagawa, not far from Kawasaki – a series of artists from all over Japan who had come to gather in a much more informal way, very different from the club atmosphere that I just described.

What was interesting here was that it was not aimed at very young people in their twenties but there was a very large proportion of fans who had brought their families. This was a part of the value set that Ken and other informants were talking to me about. This lifestyle, this ideology does not just speak to individuals. It is something that we should embody and give to the next generation. It was very prominent not just in what people were telling me but in the number of children and families that were at the event.

For these older fans, as I say mainly in their thirties, this was a lifestyle and an ideology. It was not just the music. This was something that was being completely absorbed as a worldview. Again, looking at some of the live acts, which start after dark, what was being stressed (though there were three kinds of principles being stressed, I will just talk about one of them here) was

self-expression, just being very forthright coming up with exactly what you feel, being able to say it in a friendly, conducive environment, and for people to kind of enjoy that atmosphere and that sense of freedom. Generally about five or so in a row who would perform, and they would just completely improvise what they were talking about.

One of the things that a particular artist was doing was asking the audience how much reggae, and the ideology that goes with it, had changed their lives. This got a huge response – "Yes, reggae has completely changed the way that I look at the world". This is real, powerful, almost spiritual, *evangelical* kind of stuff.

I interviewed a woman who has become a very famous reggae performer. She talked to me after her performance. I managed to stop her and interview her and she was talking about Japanese reggae. What was very important about it was that high-ranking artists often go to Jamaica for two years or more. They live in Jamaica and become part of the shanty towns of Kingston or wherever they are going to live. It puts many of us anthropologists to shame in terms of what they are able to do when they have finished their two years. They have mastered patois, have a very holistic understanding of Jamaican society, and come back. They integrate those elements, or what they feel is appropriate in those elements, to the thirties generations of fans particularly (who then pick up that ideology, messages and senses of belonging from the artists).

There is an interesting process here of transmission, of cultural brokerage, going on. From the artists to the fan base in their thirties, the people who are integrating the ideology that the artists bring from Jamaica take that ideology forward and often package it in a family-orientated worldview, something that is going to pass on to the next generation. That then seeps down slowly in dribs and drabs to the youth fan base, the kinds of people who go to the clubs in Tokyo and so on.

That was a sort of a brief ethnographic sketch of the reggae world. I think that from that world we can distill three key principles upon which it is based. I think that it is quite important for the notion of the worldview, the alternative map that I am trying to put across here.

The first is the importance of honesty and full self-expression. This is very clear in all the improvised sets of the artists that this is something we should really aim for and "don't kind of trap yourself in not being able to express yourself – just go for it and tell people what you feel".

The second one is individual agency in changing society. This is also very clear in the ideology that people talk to you about. Reggae fans will actually come out and say: "We need to take responsibility for the environment", or whatever it is. There is a real sense of individual agency in social change. Although it is expressed mainly through environmental issues, it also carries through to represent some of the care workers as I said who tend to make up a large proportion of the reggae families.

The third point is the acknowledging of social and cultural diversity as a world outlook. As I said before, and it is particularly obvious at the club events, the idea that we should not divide each

other using national/racial/cultural boundaries is not as important as sharing this common ideology or this common philosophy, this common way of life. These barriers are not particularly relevant to these people and what they are trying to set out to identify themselves as, or the worldview that they are trying to put across.

These three key principles come out with the reggae world. What I would now like to focus on is how they are ordered and popularized, which I think is very important here, looking at Japanese society, looking at the balance between the positive diversity and encompassing worldviews and those that are looking towards consolidating that homogeneity.

Def Tech is one of the main forces behind the popularization of these principles as they exist in the reggae world. It is obvious that Def Tech comes from that tradition and when you talk to the reggae fans about what they think about Def Tech, it is very interesting that they say – although they say it is a bit popularized – "Well, they are doing a great job, you know, good luck to them", which you would not get in Britain or in Europe with a popular music band that was trying to represent punk culture or something like that.

Def Tech is respected by the underground people because it is trying to do the things that they are trying to do and popularizing, organizing these three key principles. This was particularly obvious in Def Tech's live show, which I went to see in Kyoto in May. Def Tech is made up of a very short Tokyo guy with long hair and a very tall Hawaiian guy with blonde hair. It is kind of a strange mix in the first place.

What they do in their live show is very interesting. It is also what they do on their albums. The music is intertwined with small kind of sermons, of what they are talking about in the music. The music is conveying one set of ideas or principles. There is a kind of cut and normally Micro, who is the smaller man, will come out with something to support the music. For example, when we are talking about the importance of honesty and full self-expression, they will perform a song – one of those popular songs on this theme, which is called "My Way", and then after it Micro will say to everyone: "Well, don't you think that when you love somebody you should say you love them, and when you are thankful for something you should just say 'thank you'". He is trying to get people on board this principle, and people in the audience are very enthusiastic to get on board these principles.

What is interesting here is that there is a deliberate polarizing of what Micro and this fan base perceive to be their previous generation's attitudes to the things that they are talking about. So, when Micro is saying: "We need to be really forthright and express ourselves fully", there is a sense that he is referring to a generation that doesn't do that, above them, their parents. There is a sense of generational identity being created and conjured up amongst and within the performances that go on in a live show like this.

The individual agency in changing society is quite interesting too in this live show. There is a song about getting up and participating in civil society and how this is very important. After that

song finishes Micro turns to the audience and says: "What are we going to do about the gender policy issue in Japan? You guys have got to do something. It's your responsibility. Get off your asses and do something about it".

Everybody is really enthusiastic about this and gets behind him on these particular issues. Again, these principles being pulled out of what once was a very reggae underground kind of world. These principles are being popularized, made into a digestible, easy to understand form that a lot of young people are responding to in these live acts.

The acknowledgement of social and cultural diversity as a world outlook is something that they bring out not just in their own mix of being a Japanese performer and an American performer but also in their music. There is one particular except that I think is very revealing here, it is something that they emphasize so much that they leave it until the last song to perform. Unfortunately the one on the internet is not very long but it is probably long enough just to give you an idea. (Musical interlude)

You have got a sense of what is going on there. In the live set, this is very interesting because what they do is that they pretend to have a fight. They stand on opposite sides of the stage, and start pretending to be really in a state of argument. And they say: "Why are we arguing? What's going on here?" They slowly come to basically what you have just heard in their song, which is: "You know, color of skin doesn't matter", those kinds of things. They are really kind of putting across something that is not new in any way, but it is being packaged and sold to young people in perhaps a way that has not been done before. It has been integrated into these ideas of the importance of self-expression and individual agency. It has also been given a generational twist to really involve its fans.

A couple of conclusions that I would like to put across here. There is a worldview which neatly acknowledges and celebrates cultural diversity as sameness. 'What we have in common is our diversity' becomes the kind of shared concept of the fans and the people who get taken into the fold of this kind of music. In this I think that what they achieve these two styles, the Jawaiian or Pacific-island music, kind of one and the same really, and coming from this reggae background they succeed in giving people a sense of regional location, which is different from the one that went before. This is not a regional location that is based upon geography of nation states, and the East and the West. It is a geographical location that is based in values, in a generational identity, in a common set of values, in a common set of ways of seeing other people and organizing other people into a mental template of cultural pluralism.

It is very easy to look at particularly the reggae world as an example of a successful counter-culture more than anything else. However, when a band like Def Tech – not only Def Tech, there are quite a few bands that are pushing this Pacific island music or Jawaiian music – becomes interesting, I think because of the popularization process and its success, we can look at this as something going beyond merely counter-culture and perhaps something that is finding a

mainstream following; but rather than leading a generation, or a group, it is representing them.

It is interesting that in talking to some of the Def Tech fans, they do not find Def Tech and then find an ideology like a reggae fan might. You find reggae and then you begin to love all the ideology that goes with it. Def Tech seems to work in a different way. People choose Def Tech to represent themselves in the world. That is a slightly different mix and something that is interesting, in terms of popularization of some of the key principles that reggae embodies.

So coming back to this idea of a world map. One of the things that is interesting for me as a European person, is that the world map that is conjured by reggae and Pacific island music, is Pacific. It stretches to, obviously, Jamaica, it brings in all these islands, it celebrates those on the periphery, as I said before, Okinawa and Sapporo. Places are celebrated along with places like Miami and Kingston, so there is a real mix here. We are not talking about nation states. We are talking about the concentration of ideology or world view. I have an interesting map, a Pacific Ocean Depths map. Though it has nothing to do with what I am talking about, it was kind of interesting because this is a different geography. Just as ocean depths gives us a different understanding of what the world might look like, we are talking about an idea of concentrations of ideologies or shared identities – this helps to demonstrate the idea of an alternative cultural geography.

I just want to sum up by saying that the Afrasian group interests me a lot because I am also interested in conflict and conflict resolution. There is going to be a conference tomorrow and on Sunday about conflict resolution where I am going to talk about *Kenkanryu*. One of the reasons I am doing research on both extremes, kind of 'plural' celebrating Japan and 'non-plural' celebrating Japan is that in anthropological research in particular, although of course interdisciplinary research in all areas can contribute to this, if we can understand what makes something the best or the worst, we can begin to unpack those ingredients and understand how to begin to phase that out or dilute it with other identities if it is the worst, and if it is the best, how to apply the successful parts of those identities or narratives to other projects or other peoples in different regions or in the same region.

Non-Japanese, International Marriage, Identity and Rights:
Japan's Blurred Future

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Before I begin I thought what Professor Lee said just before was very applicable: researchers do not just choose a subject of research randomly. At least most of us don't, anyway. So I should let you know my biases before I begin. I am married to Japan, in the sense that my wife is Japanese. But, actually that is not the reason I began researching about this topic at all. It started much earlier than that.

And also, one of the things I would like to say before I begin is about the issue of discrimination. I am going to talk about a few things later, but one which I remembered, when Professor Lee was talking about housing, was that I had also been denied housing. It was interesting because it was not the fact that I was a foreigner who was trying to rent, because my wife at the time made all the contact and then in the end she said: "Well, my husband, he is not Japanese, is that okay?" The landlord said: "Well, is he going to live there?" She said: "Yes", and that was the problem for him; not the fact of the renting to foreigners, it was okay so long as they are not living there because they make 'smelly cooking' and so forth.

Recently, this year in fact, I was asked by Otsu-city in Shiga to translate some official documents. Shiga Prefecture is very progressive, relatively speaking, and they are trying very hard. One of the documents they asked me to translate into English was about housing. In Shiga Prefecture foreigners can apply for public housing if they like. It was a reasonably straightforward translation except for one line, which said: "If you apply and you get rejected there is an appeal process". The final line says: "However, if you are not Japanese you can not appeal". I translated this into English and I said to the lady in charge, "There is not much point putting this into English because no one can appeal". So there is a certain extent to which the generosity of officials extends, it seems.

There are a lot of things I wanted to talk about but I don't know if I will get through them all, so I'll just start straight away. This is the topic and my viewpoints are a little different to some that have been stated already. If you have any questions please ask at the end.

We are living in this world that is very much into migration these days and according to the United Nations roughly 191 million people are now living in a country that is not their country of birth. I just happen to be one of those people. Within this enormous era of global migration, Japan is often referred to as a kind of negative case if you like, a backwater. But as we all know, it has been making some quite remarkable progress recently. I want to talk about the issue of Japanese

society's position in relationship to 'international marriages' and their offspring. There are several reasons.

The first one is quite simply the number is growing, quite remarkably. (I will show you the numbers later) Therefore they are becoming a stronger force. The other one is that foreign, 'international marriage' people are quite difficult to contain and control. Migrants are quite easy because you can say: "You are not allowed in our country" for various reasons but when someone marries with a national it becomes a much more complicated issue. And, when they have children it becomes even more complicated, so much harder to control. The third point is that they threaten the so-called homogeneity of Japan, which I will talk about later. Finally, that their rights are being denied and more importantly, perhaps, their value is being ignored. This is the issue, which I would like state now: 'international marriage' partners and their offspring are really a very important group for the future of Japan.

But first I want to go back to the issue of citizenship, and just give a few ideas, which set the scene nicely. For the majority of us, we just inherit a citizenship from birth. We do not actually go out seeking one when we are young very often. In a sense we are born a "New Zealander" or "Chinese" or "Malay" or whatever it is. So sociologically speaking, citizenship is an ascribed idea. It is not so much of an acquisition or an achieved status.

Everyone knows there are basically two ways of attaining nationality. The first one is by origin and the second one is by place of birth. Generally speaking, countries which wish to maintain their homogeneity such as Japan, seek an emphasis on origin.

Now citizenship is very important because, though this is quite often overlooked, the concept implies access to certain resources such as welfare benefits for people who qualify. However, these benefits that we get come at a price and that price is the contribution we make, or citizens make, to their society. There are three avenues to citizenship I think we can identify. These are often called 'contributory rights' because we have a right to contribute and in return we get some benefit.

The first one is work. We work and then pay taxes. The second one is war. My main area of research is international relations, so war usually comes up in conversation somewhere, or public services, in other words a contribution in some kind other than work. And finally, the third one is people receiving their entitlements through the formation of households and families, which go on to become a mechanism for the future growth of the population.

So, the idea is that citizen's work is a very basic concept in the developed world. Hard work has always been the responsibility of, traditionally, males so that they could provide for their families and therefore pay taxes and provide for the country in some way. The second one is war or some other service. This was a very big contribution but in return for that you get all sorts of other benefits like pensions and so forth.

Finally, the creation of children also enables people to get entitlements to benefits, education and so forth. In the case of Japan, these three are important, or really two of them are because the

idea of war has been contracted out to the United States. So we can forget about that as a useful contribution to citizenship. But the other two still remain important. This is where I think the Japanese government is underestimating the value of the growing number of multicultural families because certainly we pay tax, and we also, in an 'international family', like most families, have children, and those children also bring benefits to the society. Let's move on to the benefits that these people bring.

Japan is, as everyone knows and the Japanese government often talks about, at a critical point now. The population is dropping. I often feel that the less people the better – the trains would be less crowded and so forth, but in terms of the Japanese government's economic point of view, it is a very serious issue.

I get the impression that the government is at least trying to do something but their efforts have not been so successful yet. And everyone knows the statistics but just to give you a couple: the population is estimated to decrease to around 105 million in the next 35 years, so that is roughly 20 million people less. Which means that the labour force is going to decrease by 10 percent in the next 25 years, which is a rather big drop – 10 percent.

Not to mention that the population is ageing and Japan's population is now the oldest ever human population, or about to become so. Of course you all know that the birth rate is the second lowest in the world, second behind Korea, I believe. So, against this backdrop – I think the country's future is very blurred – this is where the importance of 'international children' and 'international families' comes in. The Japanese government understands, I think, that there is this rather big problem, and they have come up with all sorts of plans in the recent, at least the last 5 years, the number has increased.

In 2000 there was the so-called basic plan for immigration control. This mentioned the fact that Japan should import foreign workers for the nursing sector, because there are not going to be enough. Just recently, this has been approved, on the condition that those imported laborers actually pass the Japanese "*kokkashiken*" (Proficiency Test), which is – as you can imagine – a very 'big task' for anyone. So that is basically cutting down the numbers again.

In other sectors like the information technology sector and computer engineering and programming, there is already a shortfall of roughly ten to twelve thousand people. A number of people particularly from India have come. So the government knows that they need people, and lots of other countries acknowledge the fact that they need people. This is where there is an enormous clash between what the reality is and the programs.

I was in Singapore a few weeks ago and I just happened to be there while the IMF was holding their meeting. It is very interesting because many world leaders were talking about: "We need free immigration" and "we need labor to go where it is needed" and "let's just break down all the barriers", and yet, Singapore was completely the opposite. The security was amazing – it was so blocked off. In the airport you couldn't go anywhere and there were special lanes where people

at the IMF could go and others could not go. I thought the irony was interesting.

On the one hand the economists are saying we need lots of people, but the reality is it is actually getting harder and harder to move from one place to another. I was talking to one researcher who said that probably in the future you are looking at a world where your passport is not so much about which country you are from, it is more about what diseases you do not possess, what kind of a terrorist threat you are or are not, and therefore which countries you are allowed to go to or not. It is a very pessimistic view of the world but it is quite possible that we could be going there.

But at the moment, economically speaking, the free movement of labor is something the Japanese government admits they need. Here is a quote: "To respond positively to globalization and to maintain Japan's vitality in the 21st century we cannot avoid the task of creating an environment that will allow foreigners to live normally and comfortably in this country". This implies that we are not able to live normally and comfortably at the moment. Which is true, isn't it? Also the idea of "we cannot avoid" is something that 'we really do not want to do, but we have to put up with'.

Another quote: "It would not be desirable simply to throw open the gates and let foreigners move in freely". No, that would not be desirable. "We should set up a more explicit immigration and permanent residence system". These are some recent quotes from the government. This reminds me of Prime Minister Abe's recent catch phrase about an "*Utsukushii Nihon*". In other words he is saying Japan is not beautiful now, we have got to make it beautiful. I think this way of thinking is a little bit back-to-front.

So moving on, I think that Japan provides a very unique barometer for globalization as well as a very interesting case study of other possibilities. We all know that the world is, or tends to, move around traditional western-centric ideas, and if Japan was able to develop its own migration, or at least, 'acceptance of diversity' policy somehow that was unique and successful – this would be a truly great lesson for other countries. However this is where the conflict lies – because on the surface Japan is proposing one thing, yet behind that they are doing either the opposite or nothing. And it is very confusing exactly what is going on. So the issue here I think is the importance of citizenship, and belonging – these two things.

And the importance, the question this whole topic raises for me, is that: can international couples and their children lead to a kind of grass-roots globalization? Globalization from within, if you like. Which may result in Japan becoming a much more multicultural and diverse society – so, does this group have the power to do that? As we know, migrants or people who change their country of residence, they are not only products of a global change, they are also a powerful force for a future change. So I think it is a very important sector. To put it another way, how much longer can the global ideas, which are considered alien to us? In other words, how much longer can these global ideas be considered alien when the "us" is becoming more and more "alien" in Japan?

It gets to this point, some people call it a critical mass or a spill-over point, but this is the issue I am interested in. I'd like to move on now to give you a very brief background to the idea of 'international marriage'. This idea is quite complex because you do not say in English, at least I do not say: "I have an international marriage". In Japanese you say, "I am *kokusai kekkon*", but in English you would say: "my wife is from France" or "my wife is Japanese". You do not say specifically you have an 'international marriage' so in English. The term 'international marriage' simply means you are married to someone of a different race or different ethnic background or whatever. But in Japan, it is simply about the fact that they have a different nationality to you. There is a big difference in the idea.

There are three terms traditionally that have been used to describe 'international marriages' in Japan. The very first one is *naigaikonin*, which here exemplifies the difference between inside and outside, so the marriage between someone who is not inside, and then later the word *zakkon* and this is really hard to translate into English but I did say the other day it is kind of like a 'mongrel marriage' – not a nice word – but the idea that there is something that does not belong. And finally these days people say "*kokusai kekkon*". It has become quite trendy in lots of books or handbooks what to do and so forth; it has become quite the thing to be in an international marriage.

The first 'international marriage' that was approved by the Japanese government was in 1873 between an English woman and a Japanese man. It was also incidentally the first international divorce. She left a few years later. Not surprisingly during WWII they became almost non-existent. However, afterwards they became *very* popular, thanks to the so-called "war brides". Finally they have grown in significance, particularly in the last few years. Latest statistics say that 1 in 15 marriages is now an 'international marriage'.

In the remainder of my time I want to briefly highlight some of the cultural, social, legal and political, or ideological barriers that people who are in 'international marriages' face and in so doing, show what they reveal about Japan's attitude towards 'international marriages', couples, families and so forth. The first one – the first issue I want to talk about – is the most difficult, and that is citizenship.

Just a brief background of information here – this is the number of foreign people, residents in Japan (Figure 1). The next one is international marriages in Japan for the last 30-odd years (Figure 2). The top black line is the total, the middle line is when one of the partners involved is a foreign wife, and the bottom one is a foreign husband. So the greatest number is between Japanese men and foreign women.

The first point I would like to talk about briefly is citizenship. This idea is very complicated and it is also very touchy. There are people today who talk about this idea of a flexible citizenship becoming the norm in the future, in other words, people will change their citizenship numerous times in their working life. Whether that is the way the world is going or a more pessimistic version as I said before, no one really knows, but in the immediate future anyway – it is reasonable

Figure 1: Japan's Registered Foreign Population
Source: Japanese Immigration Service Statistics.
    http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/toukei/index.html

Figure 2: International Marriages in Japan
Source: Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare Statistics.
    http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/suii04/marr2.html

to assume that the number of people moving around is going to increase. So, undoubtedly this is going to cause problems in Japan.

Traditionally in Japan the idea of citizenship has been defined by the concept of blood. There are a couple of quotes here – these quotes tend to disagree with Professor Befu's comments slightly before but, some people would say that "to be Japanese you can not be, you have to be Japanese not only legally but also culturally and most important biologically". That is one way of viewing it. The second quote here is even worse: "Only those born of Japanese parents can be Japanese. Nobody can become Japanese". Here the title 'Japanese' means '*real* Japanese'. If you have this mindset, you can see the impact it has on international families and children because in effect you are leaving them in a limbo status, if we are not 'Japanese' then what are we? If we do not look

100 percent 'Japanese' then what are we?

The next point, therefore, is about the identity and rights of international children. Naturally with international marriage you have an increase in the number of international children. Again there are some very interesting terms which are used in relation to these children. The first one is – originally they were called "*ai no ko*" which originally means: "a child of two things". I believe this word is no longer used by the Japanese. It does seem to have a discriminatory tone.

The second term which was used after WWⅡ: "*konketsuji*" – the idea of literally mixed blood. Here you can see the importance of having Japanese blood, whether you agree with it or not, is beside the point. It exists as a term.

These days the word that is most commonly used is "half", which is not a very nice term because it implies that something is missing. So a lot of international families have used these other terms such as "double", which is, in other words, not actually missing anything here but gaining something else – you are twice as good. This term "double" and the other term "*kokusaijin*" (international person/citizen) have not really gained any acceptance, other than from a small group of people, and neither of them really answers the question of why you need to have a special term to define people who are to all extents Japanese anyway, legally speaking.

These children actually encounter numerous problems in their lives, thanks to the Japanese government's reluctance to sort out their situation. Japan's nationality law says that children of international marriages are required to choose their nationality by the age of 22. This is the poster from the ministry, the Department of Justice[1]. It says 'let's clear it up'. However, the only thing that you are actually clearing up is the fact that this is a very good thing to do – but only for the Japanese administrative side. "Let's sort out your nationality. What are you? Japanese or not?" I only have one nationality so this concept is very difficult to contemplate. But, demanding young adults to make an impossible choice between two cultures – which is basically asking them to choose one parent or one culture over another – I think, reveals the lack of understanding of these delicate issues not to mention it infringes on the children's right of allowing them to associate with both their nations of ancestry.

This chart in the next slide shows, my ideas are very liberal I admit, and many people would disagree, the number of countries that do accept children as 'multi-nationals' and it is increasing (Table 1).

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[1] http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji06.html

Table 1: Selected Countries Dual Citizenship Acceptance Status

Sweden	○	Switzerland	○
Denmark	○	Greece	○
Finland	△	Italy	○
Norway	△	Spain	○
Iceland	△	Portugal	○
Netherlands	○	Britain	○
Belgium	○	Ireland	○
France	○	New Zealand	○
Germany	△	Canada	○
Switzerland	○	U.S.	○
Greece	○	Japan	×

○ : Allowed △ : Allowed for people of designated countries × : Not allowed

Source: Kondo, Atsushi. 2000. Foreign residents on slow boat to get vote.

The Japan Times, 28 September.

The countries with circles do, the ones with the triangles do depending on which country you are from, and the ones with the "*batsu*" (crosses), they do not. Japan and Singapore are not the only countries of course, there are many other countries – this is just a random selection.

Ironically, as long as you just tell the Japanese government that yes, at 22 I am going to be Japanese, and you do not tell the other country involved that: "I am not going to be 'you' anymore", in the Japanese government's eyes you are only Japanese, but in the other government's eyes you are both. Roughly 400,000 people in Japan at present are in this situation, which is a serious number of identity crises.

The next topic is about the legal issues which are involved. Of course there are many, so I am not going to talk about all of them. I will just mention a few. Until 1996 simply being a parent of a Japanese child was not a valid reason to be in Japan if your marriage had dissolved. If a Japanese and non-Japanese get married and have a child and they get divorced, the non-Japanese parent could – and very often was – asked to leave Japan. After 1996 the government changed the rule, the law said that in such a situation you could apply for what is known as a Parental Visa, which is an improvement. But the idea of being a single parent particularly a mother in Japan is extremely difficult. I think that a foreign mother is not recognized as an individual by the Japanese state. Her livelihood in Japan is legitimated only through her connection to either to a man or a child, unless she is qualified for and chooses Japanese citizenship. What's more this change from 1996 does not seem to be universally applied. There was a case just recently in 2001. A Pakistani man who had two children had lived in Japan for twenty years. He had two children with his Japanese wife. They got divorced. And he was asked to leave Japan. He is fighting against the deportation.

In the case of divorce, wives from Asian nations are at much greater disadvantage for various reasons. One reason is – even if children are not involved, there is no legal right to remain in Japan

– so they can be deported, but in this case, very often, they have the right to seek money from the Japanese spouse. But very often the Japanese immigration department will act first, and deport them before they have any chance to exercise their legal rights.

There is an interesting quote from the immigration office in Osaka which says: "If a foreign wife does not live with her husband, in our regard she is not fulfilling her duty in acting as a wife". Therefore, except for special cases, such as that of a wife whose husband is in prison, the immigration office does not permit visa extensions. So there are many cases of women who are in abusive relationships, suffering from domestic violence and so forth, being forced to put up with it rather than end their marriage and leave.

As an interesting aside to the Japanese government's way of thinking, in a deportation case they attempt to send you back to your country of birth. There was a recent case of a Bolivian woman who was ordered to leave Japan to go back to Bolivia where she has spent three months of her life. The Japanese government's reasoning was that she would have no trouble living in Bolivia. She lived in Japan for 18 years, three months in Bolivia, but she would have no trouble living in Bolivia, because there are a number of people of Japanese descent there, as well as a number of supermarkets selling Japanese food it was reported.

This kind of logic speaks volumes for the attitude of the Japanese state towards people who are not Japanese. Unfortunately there is another serious issue of 'stateless children', those who are born illegitimate children of foreign nationals and Japanese. Though there are only estimates, there are a few thousand of such children in Japan.

Finally on this point the idea that being, under Japan's current law, the illegitimate child of a foreign mother and a Japanese father is eligible for Japanese nationality only when the father legally admits paternity before marriage. Japan is the only country in the world that has this rather unusual law. No other nation has such a system. Until recently Britain did seem to have a similar policy, however, when the United Nations pointed out that it was discriminatory they changed it. Japan however does not agree that it is necessarily discriminatory.

Moving on to the next idea, which is that of the ideology of state control in the family. Let me just briefly go through this. I am sure you have all heard of the concept of "*koseki*" (family register) and "*juminhyou*" (resident permit). A *juminhyou* is a legal document, which says on the bottom that it is a list of all members of the household. But it is not in the case of international families because foreign spouses are not automatically listed on the "*juminhyou*". Foreigners have a "*gaikokjin tourokusho*" (foreign resident's permit), so they are covered, so to speak, legally and administratively. But this idea of splitting up people, of families, solely on the basis of their nationality causes numerous problems in daily life in Japan, which I am sure you are all familiar with. So we will go on the next point.

This is another sad story, unfortunately in Japan, child abduction. Japan is in the unenviable position of ranking first among all Asian nations as the number one country for active abduction

cases. This is simply because Japan has not signed the 1980 Hague Convention on Child Abduction. What this means basically is that Japan is a safe haven to take your children to if you want to divorce, for example.

There is a very active organization on this issue, Childwatch Japan, which is trying to reunite families that have been sadly split up. One example is that of a Canadian man, Mr. Murray Wood, whose two children were abducted by his Japanese wife, when they were living in Canada. His wife said she was going back to Japan for 10 days and asked if she could take the children with her. He had sole custody of the two children. He said: "Sure". She never came back to Canada. Of course he went through various channels to try and get them back. The Japanese government refused point blank to cooperate and the Japanese police would do nothing. What happened was a Japanese court had to decide who had custody so they ignored the Canadian court's ruling and awarded custody to the mother. This is exactly what the convention was supposed to avoid. So she became the sole custodian in Japan in spite of the fact that she is wanted for abduction in Canada now. This case is still ongoing. He has not seen his children for 5 years.

Another case is that of a Cuban woman. Her Japanese husband abducted their two year-old child from Cuba back to Japan. And the same situation happened. She came to Japan and has been fighting ever since to see her child again. Unfortunately she had another setback last year when the Japanese government refused her a visa extension. So she now can not be in Japan to continue her fight. She has to continue from overseas. Japan is probably the safest country in the world if you want to abduct your children, too.

I am nearing the end. In conclusion I want to make a comparison with Korea. Why? Because in April this year, the Korean government came up with what they called a 'Grand Plan' which aims to socially integrate foreign wives and create a multicultural society. All of a sudden the Korean government has come up with some really radical plans. Until recently Korea was on a par with Japan in terms of the way international couples were being treated. This is a broad summary of what they have done.

The first thing is regulating international marriage agencies and protecting foreign wives before they enter; Korea, as with Japan, does have a fairly large marriage industry. Second, support for victims of domestic violence; Third, support and orientation for new wives; Fourth, and more importantly, supporting children of 'international marriages' in schools – making special programs for bi-racial children – including dual-language programs, and trying to prevent racism; Finally raising awareness of multicultural issues, which includes replacing terms like "mixed-blood children" with more politically correct ones and so forth.

They are also considering allowing dual nationality. This progressive plan is something that is not that difficult to implement. If Japan could come up with one, it could have been seen as a leader in these issues in Asia. Now I think the Japanese government has a lot to learn from its immediate neighbours in this regard.

In order to sum up, I think that the Japanese government is persisting with outdated ideas of assimilation. It is very easy for foreign people like myself to criticize. However, whenever they say "you are not Japanese, you have no right to criticize", my answer to such people is that there is this idea in international relations of 'reciprocity' – what goes in one country should go in the other. Japanese people in New Zealand are treated much better than New Zealand people are treated in Japan, and there are numerous issues which I could give you examples of but I will not for lack of time.

Finally, I just wanted to finish by saying that in the end this issue is all about belonging and acceptance, quite simply. Who can belong in Japan and in what capacity? These are questions that Japan's leaders want to answer by themselves. But the world is no longer such a place and it is becoming much more difficult for them to answer them without taking into consideration other countries' ideas.

Japan's ability to fuse globalizing pressures with tradition and the ability to maintain cultural tradition and harmony while accepting diversity provides a very interesting future canvas. Serious and detailed debate about these issues like citizenship, ethnicity, language, and so forth which require an examination, or a re-examination, of all of the ideas upon which this society is built is needed for this nation's future. But the final question is who can be considered a citizen in Japan and allowed to participate in such a debate? We can. I will stop there.

Comment

Greg Poole

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First of all, thank you all for coming and for organizers for inviting all of us. It has been a very stimulating afternoon, I should say. As a preamble here, I would like to say that some of the comments I might be making were not discussed today because I got a paper especially from Professor Chapple and he did not include some of the things. I am going to include stuff from his full paper, a little bit anyway, which will hopefully be a positive thing, with the purpose of eliciting some discussion from the audience in my brief comment.

First, I just want to review a few of the points made by Professor White and Professor Chapple. I will be taking these in turns, then add a few personal reflections. And finally offer an interpretation of how both these papers might add to this project of the symposium series, at least as I understand it, which is a project that arguably is a paramount one of the future of humankind, which is conflict prevention and resolution.

With Bruce, he offered us an ethnographic study that represents a refreshing bottom-up approach. I think that deepens our understanding of this changing identity in Japan. The ideological message of Jawaiian music and the reggae scene, as it were, just to summarize again the points that you made, expressing feelings truly and honest self-expression. Social change that can be achieved through individual agency and the commonality of the human experience transcends differences with diversity. Then the common ways of life as markers for a collective identity. The messages in the people that he studied point to an alternative imagination in society and culture of the world as plural and on the move. These popular artists are re-conceptualizing the global others from the position of human sameness rather than national or cultural differences emphasizing a global similarity rather than a Japanese uniqueness. And it was an important point when you said that these represent a world view that already exists and that they are just identifying with, for example Def Tech, as having the same world view that they already have for themselves.

Reflecting on my own personal observations, this realization of sameness amongst Japanese youth, rings true and is especially evident when face to face with the other, as it were. We have students that study abroad at the University of Oregon and there was an interesting incident at San Francisco Airport with a group of students; I think it was two years ago when they arrived at San Francisco. One of the students observed another Japanese tourist saying "*Suge! Gaijin ippai irun da*", or "Wow! Look at all the foreigners." Then I quipped "*Omae no hou ga gaijin dayo*!" I said "You are the foreigner." All the students broke into laughter and we all laughed about it because I think it affirmed, it was a real affirmation of this ludicrous and plural nature of the other that we are

all others in a sense. It just depends on geography. And then again in the residential halls this year at the University of Oregon, even with their very limited second language skills, the students had the ability, and I was kind of amazed at this because in the past I did homestays and I was not able to observe as closely, but they made immediate connections with their peers, mostly American but other international students as well, just in a few days through the expressive art form of music and dance and communication tools such as cell phones. They all had to get their own mobile phones and computers. They observed differences excitedly and though they lacked confidence in their verbal and communication skills, or I should say verbal communication skills, they seemed to feel comfortable with the plurality probably more so than the American students would have, although I do not have data to back this up, just from my impression. Because they connect readily with the way of life, to borrow Bruce's term, of the way of life as university students in the United States. Brian Street's notion of culture as a verb, he is a British anthropologist who talks about culture as a verb not a noun. This idea, this notion resonated very strongly. It is a very easy way to talk to students about culture because they understand grammar. It resonates strongly with my students in their seminar class. They decided to respond to this static essentialized concept of Japanese culture by using hip-hop as an example of society on the move in their z*emi-happyou* (presentations in Seminar) last year. Interestingly, Professor Lee might agree, the sociologist, Alistair Pennycook and others are looking at how language used in the global hip-hop scene is trans-lingual and trans-cultural and defies linguistic, cultural and national boundaries. This begs the question of whether the frameworks of analysis that many social scientists, such as ourselves, operate within are not constrained too narrowly on this idea of a nation state. Even language, as whole entities, should we be working on a national based concept of language, for example, is one of the ideas that he and his colleagues are bringing up. Are we ignoring the emic-realities, the ethno-methodology and the world use of people we are looking at? By sharing with us the voice of language and the music of Def Tech and the followers of reggae music in Japan, Bruce demonstrated through emic-analysis the importance of problematizing in our etic modal analysis, overly narrow frameworks, such as dichotomies such as east and west, or ill-defined concepts such as internationalization, *kokusaika*.

The next paper, in Julian's if I may, provided us with such careful top-down analysis of *kokusaika* in Japan, more so in the written paper today, he talked more about *kokusaika*, internationalization. I say top-down because he is focusing on policy, on the powerbrokers, the state as it were. He is coming from that perspective. By pointing out in very real terms discord of rhetoric and reality, policy and reality, Julian not only reiterates previous work by Professor Befu, supporting the argument that habitus of homogeneity contradicts multiculturalism, and also are arguments by McVeigh and others to name a few, but also frames the problem in a new light from the perspective of non-Japanese immigrants in Japan. He talks about *shoshika* and *koreika,* the declining population and the aging population in Japan. These are phenomena that point to the need for immigration. He also highlights inequality and discrimination experienced by the non-

Japanese community. And by bringing up this case of Korea, as one example of a progressive plan, he brings to the table some constructive action points, as he mentions them in his paper, for the Japanese government toward achieving a goal of a pluralistic society.

Just reflecting on Julian's paper a little bit haphazard here, with respects to identity and rights of nationality to international children, choosing between citizenships, there is one contrast I think we can make, of course I think maybe it is too much of a given but between your American/Japanese children, self-identifying as half or halves or occasionally double, as he mentioned. And playing on this relative status, in the popular culture, of biculturalism amongst youth which indicates perhaps what I have observed anyways, indicates a fair amount of unconcern of having to choose between two citizenships. Contrasting this with the experience of Asian/Japanese children, who sadly feel forced, as Professor Lee was, to hide their mixed status. Like Julian implies, the government positions in a legal system is anachronistic for sure.

Another example, this could be accessed to reproductive technologies. I do not know if you are familiar with this case of Mukai Aki, who is an actress, she and her pro-wrestler husband had twins from a surrogate mother in the United States. Just finally, this past week, these twins were finally granted Japanese citizenship. In the Japanese law, DNA does not count in that case. It is kind of interesting because this child was born to an American, was not conceived but born to an American, the children were not Japanese. So they were stateless children.

Moving on to legal issues and status; a personal example, in my case, when my three-year-working-visa was reduced to a six-month spouse visa, when I got married, this kind of indicates the hesitancy of the Ministry of Justice to grant status to aliens that do not, because the status does not restrict their work or their life activities. Also, another aside, on this term *zakkon*, when I got married, my wife was very surprised when one of her friends said "*Gaijin to kekkon shita kara, ano zasshu ga umarerun da ne.*" That is, now you got married with a foreigner so you are going to have mongrel children. This idea of *zasshu*, all comes back to this *konketsuji.* There is a curious inconsistency in the legal system that though blood is sufficient for claiming citizenship in the case of third generation Japanese South Americans for example, blood is not always sufficient in the case of illegitimate children or children of Japanese married couples, such as Mukai Aki, who was delivered by a surrogate mother. State control of families; Julian pointed out in his paper how traditional norms of *ie* (patriarchal family system), have been weakened in urban Japan. Especially amongst youth in urban Japan which is another example of the discord between conservative policy makers and the general public. For example another striking example of this inflexibility is also a personal example because my wife was involved with an *undou* (movement) program to try to legalize *fufu-bessei*, or being able to keep your own surname after marriage.

This inflexibility is quite apparent. Also related to the state control of family, as Julian pointed out in this issue of *koseki* and *jyuminhyou*, is the *gaijin* card, *gaikokujin touroku shoumeisho*. The personal frustration I had was, for example, going into the office and having to go in on a weekday

to renew this card. And for me, being an elite in Japan, as it were, I could take the day off from work. But then I live in Gunma and there are many Peruvian and Brazilian Japanese mostly. To think that they have to take a day off from work to get this renewed is state control and can be oppressive at times.

As to child abductions, Japan is a haven for child abductions. It also works the other way. I wanted to point out a case of a friend of a friend who is an American father who divorced his Japanese wife, apparently after an abusive situation. He successfully abducted his children to the U.S so it works because there is no reciprocity you see.

Moving along, citizenship and belonging; the important point here is that human migration has long challenged the construction and reconstruction of nation states as Bruce's map showed with the Def Tech chart. It is a challenge that has never been greater in recent years. Julian brought up the idea of flexible citizenship, or Willis in Professor Lee and Professor Befu's new book who talks about criminalization, which is a similar concept. This is very pertinent because more and more individuals are already having difficulty answering the seemingly innocent question of "So, where are you from?" It is hard for me to answer that. This might be a bit biased because a lot of us in this room might have had this feeling but I think it is pertinent. I wonder if this relates indirectly anyway to Bruce's observations of this recently pluralistic worldview in Japan amongst the youth that identifies less with the differences in local and national economies but more on the commonalities of flexible transnational ways of life: *ikikata, raifusutairu* (lifestyle).

One question posed, in juxtaposing these two papers is whether or not the *nihonjinron* of cultural nationalism or habits of homogeneity might be giving way in Japan to a more cosmopolitan mindset of pluralism. I would like to think so, and certainly there are indicators to suggest this, as Bruce has pointed out, that this may be the case among the younger generation at least. Not only Bruce but I think Gordon Matthews and Kingston and Willis and a few others, and this Sekisui house incident. But of course the events in the news indicate that at least the present generation of power brokers in Japan, i.e. Abe and Asou, in Japan still hold very dearly and dangerously to a Japan centric world view and the vision of Asian global politics. Of course Julian's paper supports this very clearly. I guess my next question is whether generational change in mass populization of this world view can influence policy? Can we, or more importantly, can the politicians and older generations learn from the ethno-methodology of Japanese who are beginning to demonstrate a flexible worldview of culture, one that is not so static and structural, much like the direction in cultural theory that social scientists have embraced in recent years.

And finally, to talk about Julian's list of action points towards policy change in Japan, toward a more enlightened form of politics perhaps, or cosmopolitics. The first one is a full government recognition and support, recognition of support for alternative educational institutions along with a language policy that considers bilingual education, which for now, the policy is no policy, which could be a strong policy. The second one is the change in the legal system to protect international

families which he showed is happening in Korea; dual nationality, the other point would be *juminhyou* and then the serious debate, generally on diversity in Japan, which is what we have been talking about all afternoon. These action points are a very tall order and as I think Professor Befu has suggested, it is not easily affected through the top down *gaiatsu* (external pressure) approach. Human rights as a top-down tool is a weak one. On the other hand, as Julian points out, the positive light is that the government is losing a grip and there is change from the grass roots level up. Let's face it, though perhaps a bitter struggle, change is inevitable, hopefully not towards the pessimistic view that he presented as well. *Kokusaika* will have been achieved when it no longer resonates an affective policy slogan. It still strikes a chord only because the general public acknowledges a gap between this rhetoric and reality.

Julian's thesis of a government's bureaucracy, or perhaps social structure, that's quick to prescribe and define in terms, is out of touch with the popular beliefs as Bruce was so aptly pointing out. The youth are better qualified to affect social change as they understand the potential of individual agency. Which brings us back to our core debate of social science of the chicken or egg relationship of social agency and social structure. Perhaps agents of bottom-up youth movements can affect change through the ideology of Jawaiian activism and truly internationalize Japan. Or is this too rosy a picture, given the fervent nationalism on the far right presently holding political power? As a final thought these two papers exemplify one interpretation of the theme of this symposium series; conflict prevention and resolution. This interpretation is that social science research is important. It is important because it can offer a window into elite perspectives from the center and alternative ones from the periphery. It unpacks and interposes these perspectives either with an etic top-down or emic bottom-up analysis and then offers some insights into applying these strategies on co-existence critically yet constructively for the good of society and humanity.

Bradley: We will open up to the floor to questions and/or discussion.

Q1: I am very interested in Def Tech in that their music promotes ideas of individual agency in change in society. Have you seen any indication of these young people involved in this getting to political activities afterwards like getting involved in NPOs, NGOs etc.? My second question is what attracted these young people into this? Are they relatively highly educated with educated middle class backgrounds who have seen what you can get out of hard work, money and a good education? Or are they the kind of people who were disadvantaged at the start, and in a way challenging the established order which they have given up?

White: Yes, thank you. The responses that I have seen and I will divide those into two sorts of groups, one of them being mainly my students who would be university educated people. Their response to Def Tech and this kind of scene are to get involved in things like NGOs and NPOs. I think again something like Def Tech already represents people who are already in action in some way and encourages people to think about civil participation not necessarily just getting involved in NPOs but also talking to their friends about an issue in society where people might not have done that before. So I think that there are ways in which the scene encourages people to have a dialogue with each other and depending on the kind of person they are and what stage they are in their life they might choose to take that further if these opportunities come and present themselves. I have had a chance to talk to people in Osaka, some fans of Def Tech in Osaka, people who tend not to be university graduates that I have spoken to and have not gone to university necessarily. I think what is interesting about this is a lot of what this world view, represents is an ability to recognize diversity and diversity not in terms of racial or cultural diversity but the diversity of, say a family, configurations that there are, so my friend's family is divorced, or my friend's father is living with his gay lover or whatever it might be. Diversity in terms of local configuration of family relationships, friendships, all those kinds of problems that are caused by ultramodern societies that social workers end up working in. People who are growing up in these ultra diverse communities find the voice in the kind of music that this is putting forward. So I think that for people with opportunities to do things for society, maybe students that are reared up other ways too, they might go on to do things like NPO activities. But for other people who are just experiencing the effects of diversity and majority an ultramodern society puts upon you, it becomes a voice for their diverse experiences, a representation of their experiences on a larger canvas which is talking about cultural, trans-cultural exchange, or shared world views that acknowledge that pluralism.

Q2: Your description about the younger people who are in love with reggae is pretty interesting. I can identify with them as well but my sort of recent interest is, are they just consuming mainstream Def Tech or other counter-culture things, and do they pass or do they graduate, for instance when they reach a certain age? Do you see any sort of signs in that aspect? My second question is not only the generational or time factor but also the impact or size factor. How big are they? Meaning if we are talking about the global identity, that is really a challenge of the conventional understanding of the Japanese identities. If these phenomena that you reported are making some real challenges, I would like to expect them, more than just being original in their own lifestyle. How about their behavior on the economic, financial side? Or how do they cope with the social system? For instance do they go into a conventional marriage or do they go into *jijitsukon*? Have you tried to ask those kinds of questions comparing two spheres of their lifestyle, raving at night and their daily public life with social and government systems?

White: The first part of the question was really about the generational gap. One of the interesting things that I found was this three tier structure of the reggae scene. I am not talking about the Def Tech popularized scene, just the reggae underground scene which really has a counter-culture feel about it. The artists at the top and middle generation, in their mid thirties and some in their early forties, who had followed reggae as a sort of ideology since their twenties, they were really the people who would have lived the principles of the music out in their lives and that meant that a lot of them tended to be social workers or careers, or operating in that sort of area of society that is not the catalyst for generating that kind of world. They were desperately trying to be anti-consumerist in that sense. Of course they ended up being consumers as all of us do anyway. Their identities are wrapped around the idea of avoiding that way of life, that world view.

By contrast what was interesting is the younger fans. The people that I observed in the clubs in Tokyo were very much about consuming than using. They would all buy the CDs and you saw the T-shirts and everything were all there, so there is a whole consumerist culture around the central principles that the older generation had tried to filter out. The young people were getting pulled in because of the consumerist fashion status of this underground scene. But then, slowly some of them were imbued with some of the principles over time. That is how it began for Ken. He said that he liked fashion in the first place and that it was an interesting sort of set of styles, but then slowly became indoctrinated into this ideology of the reggae scene.

Q2: The second question is how do they cope with social structure and system which conventionally sort of define the Japanese homogeneity and the Japanese identities.

White: I am only really talking about the reggae world rather than the Def Tech world. For people like Ken they choose occupations that tend to put right what they see is wrong in society. In that

way they live out what they feel is wrong with Japan in whatever way.

Q2: In addition to occupation, let's say social state norms like a *juminhyo* or a marriage.

White: Ken's marriage was very standard. I do not think there was anything they did differently from their peer group. There are a lot of people including some good friends of mine who are not even in that peer group at all and are not married at all, and who live together and have children or many couples in their thirties and who have been together for 10 years or more and from the outside would be perceived as a couple or a partnership. Others get married on paper to get the loan for the house. They will use the system in a way, as a comfortable way of life, although they are very anti-establishment in most of the ways that they approach issues.

Q2: So they accommodate the social system.

White: In order to support their own way of life.

Bradley: We have a question in the back.

Q3: Just one thing is that in the African side of Afrasia, there is a really interesting parallel that someone told me that in Africa, that Japan is not the only one with complications coming up between issues concerned with nationality and residence in a foreign country which is all about rights and obligations of the state, and the other issues like marriages and citizenship which are traditionally really left to the local communities to do what they like or individuals even. But there are the three things today, they have three different agendas.

I want to get back to what Professor Befu was talking about. First of all, which was not a question of nationality or as in Bruce's paper people deciding where they belong or who they like to hang out with, it is an issue which Beverly Yamamoto, who is here can probably tell it better because it is her story. It is the issue of how and why of having no face. For example there is an international marriage mother not on the *koseki* (family register) as you say and this freaks out the local government who assumes that the two children living without a mother, living all day at home without a mother. As I understand the story, when the government worker arrives, Beverly is there and is invisible. She says "Yeah, I'm the mum." She can even prove saying "We are married," and so on but to the government worker she is invisible because on their *koseki* there is no mother. It is a very strange situation but it is not unique. How is that situation talked about from human rights and so on? How can that arise, how can that become a kind of common sense that is so ridiculous? I think in a way that is what Professor Befu was trying to refer to in terms of the civic society and citizenship where a mother is a mother but you are not on the *koseki*, you are not

the mother, so how does that happen?

Q4: Can I just tell another story? The theme is the same, but some of the content is slightly different. This was from something I presented last time most of us got together. Once I moved up to Osaka and my husband stayed down in Fukuoka. They can not put a foreigner on the *koseki*, so then who is the head of household? Well, it would have to be my 12 year old daughter. I went mad. Who is paying local taxes then? It was the stupidity of the system and that in that case I was totally and one hundred percent invisible. You have this ridiculous situation where my daughter who is a 12 year old, still in compulsory education and a minor, was listed as head of household.

So the concept, the ludicrousness of it was right, slight difference in the content but it fits in directly with your thing. The fact that in terms of how I explained it in my talk was that in terms of categories of foreigner and Japanese can not possibly live in the same household even though they are physically living there. Therefore the system can not deal with that situation.

The sort of ridiculousness of these things in another area of my research was to do with sexuality where any woman who has an abortion has to get consent of spousal or someone who is equivalent of a spouse, that is, *haigusha, aruiwa haigusha no you na kata*. For many women there is no spouse, there is no equivalent of a spouse, and if you are a minor you certainly do not want to tell who the person was probably. Everyone knows the system is ludicrous but it does not change, and that is a slightly different example but there are similarities in the way the system quite evidently does not work but no one wants to set precedents, no one actually wants to change it. That was just my adding to what was said earlier.

Bradley: It does sound like comments to me but does anyone want to respond to that? Or I should respond to the claim that we are all having different agendas, because I am the one that organized the panel. I think identity does cover a wide range of things. I see a hand up there so maybe we can have another question or two.

Q5: I also had an experience when my husband was based in Tokyo. It was my three year-old son that was in the same situation. But another question related to Julian's very interesting enlightening talk has to do with invisibility. I was thinking about your question earlier about what about the people who are not so clearly Japanese, or not Japanese, growing up in the society that you mentioned, there are 400,000 people who are in this situation. Many of us face in the near future those who have said "Yes I am Japanese but I also have another." So in response to your earlier question there is invisibility and it is also not possible for people to talk about the fact they are concealing their second nationality. I am wondering a little bit more about the 400,000 people, and where the data comes from, whether there are qualitative oral history types of research or not.

Chapple: The number is conservative, I think. Because in fact the number of international marriages is a very difficult number to pin point, because it does not include those married overseas to Japanese and others as well various others who are in effect married or were married, and no longer married, so these numbers are vague. The Japanese Government has some very definite statistics on lots of things but just how valid they are, we need to consider. 400,000 was an estimate by a friend of mine who has done similar research. She believes by calculating a certain number of people it suggests that there are roughly that many people who are in this situation. That does not of course include people who choose at 22 years-old to become Japanese. Just to add to the comment before it is ludicrous, the situation is crazy, and your comment "where does it come from", if I could give my humble personal opinion, it comes from a very firm belief, in that good things from the past should not change in Japan, and tradition is something to be valued, which is good to an extent, but when it gets to the ridiculous and issues that affect peoples lives on a daily basis you have to make changes, I think. Anyone who has lived in Japan for a number of years could come up with thousands of stories about ridiculous things that do not make any sense and you bang your head against the wall going crazy with our so called logical western way of thinking because it does not make sense, you can explain it to the officials until you are blue in the face but they will always come back and say "Well look, that's never been done before, you can not do it". Because it has never been done before it is not a reason you can not do it, even in my professional life, even just people we deal with in the office, "we can not do that, that's it". And I would blame it on their educations.

Bradley: We have some time for one or two more questions.

Q6: I just want to make a comment. In hearing what has been going on, we get the impression that the central bureaucracy of Japanese government has been very successful in forcing aside because nothing changes, but I think it is a somewhat secured understanding in a sense that some of the local governments do make changes. For instance in Osaka prefecture, they accept children without legal status. They are not supposed to, according to the Immigration Department in Tokyo, but they do because the principal after all has the discretion and the Education Board has decided that the children, regardless of the legal status, can come to school.

As for the *juminhyo*, I got married to a *gaijin*, an Australian New Zealander, who has dual nationality. I did make sure his name appears on the *juminhyo* although I am the household head. I kept my family name. The thing is they do not tell you that you can do it unless you ask, so I think if the citizens are more informed on what you can ask, there might be some ways to make changes. My colleagues in the central government do not have complete control, for instance, maybe those young people who are learning to have individual agency.

Bradley: Last question maybe.

Q7: I have triple nationality with rights to a fourth. I am also married to a Japanese person with a Japanese child. The Japanese administration is not the most difficult in the world to deal with. I am French American and Australian as well, and I am not sure which two of those are harder. My point was every time I say something to one of my relatives, they say "But Matthew, 10 years ago it was exactly the same here". How far behind? You say Japan is outdated – by the way you can add Austria to the countries that do not allow dual nationality – how far behind is Japan? I do not think it is as far behind as everyone seems to have this image, as you say local government is making changes.

Chapple: That is a good point. When I used to teach in New Zealand the students would often say what about this in Japan? What about that? And I'd always say Japan is thirty years behind and that was ten years ago, now I'd say Japan is ten years in gap. In some respects, and this is the interesting thing about Japan, it is miles ahead, and in some respects it is way behind. That is why I guess we feel a kind of confusion. The global image of Japan is its technologically advanced, yet when I first came here there was no computer in the *kuyakusho* (ward office) and they were writing everything by hand and I was just stunned. Everyone was using computers by that stage in New Zealand and your point about, I would say 10 years but really it depends on what you regard as most important. But I agree that Japan is not the most, in some respects. Japan moves incredibly quickly, and definitely it is true there are some progressive prefectures and cities. The one I live in now, Otsu-city is not the most, but when I did research I traveled virtually all round the country and talked to all sorts of prefectural people and they had 180 degree different ideas of what we can and can not allow. This led me to the conclusion that they do have a lot of autonomy within their flexibility. But the Japanese government still provides this very bleak picture, a very one sided picture of what things are like. That leaves a lot of confusion and imbalance, inflexibility, and problems. When I was back in New Zealand I went to talk to the immigration office because New Zealand's immigration policy changes by the day, they decide we are going to accept 30,000 people a month this week and next week they would say "No, we do not need any more". It is extremely flexible. But one thing which does not change is the fact that they allow dual nationality and so forth and when I talked to them about this policy the man said, and excuse my language, he said "We don't give a shit". So you know other countries can do what they like. Nationality, citizenship does not mean anything anymore, it is just the color of your passport. I think it is all about how you perceive what is most important. In Japan the government is still trying to cling to this belief that there is something unique and somehow we are trying to persist with it.

Bradley: I have the unfortunate job of saying we should have to cut it off right here even though

we have just made interesting discussions, just hitting the tip of the iceberg. I would like to ask Professor Nagasaki, the Director of Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies, a brief greeting.

Nagasaki: Thank you very much everyone. It is really a great pleasure to attend this kind of meeting. This is a kind of an eye-opener for me. I came to know many different and difficult situations and problems that are happening in Japan. But please let me remind you that this meeting is organized and supported by Ryukoku University that is supposed to be one of the more conservative universities in Japan but still I think they are positive and they support this kind of project. One thing is, of course, the importance of trying to see the Japanese and Japanese society from a different angle by hearing and learning from foreign people.

In my case almost thirty years ago, one of my closest friends, a Japanese girl who married a Thai boy had to leave Japan because in those days, the children whose father was a foreigner could not get Japanese nationality even though the mother was Japanese. So she had to leave Japan because of her children. Her children could only get Thai nationality and not Japanese nationality, so she is still living in Thailand as a Thai. Even Japanese people could not safely live in Japan just because she married a foreign husband. That was the situation in those days. Since then I have been thinking of this kind of real view that the state controlled family, the seriousness of this problem in Japan. So I am really happy to participate in this kind of meeting.

Another thing I want to add is about my appeal to the *kyojukai* (faculty meeting) in my department two years ago. I am sorry to mention about my personal matter, but I remarried, and I wanted to keep the former family name but, of course, the university office people who did not want me to do so. I appealed that because I had been writing under Nagasaki's name and had many books and articles under that name. The *kyojukai* supported me and I succeeded, meaning Ryukoku University changed its rules. Now it is said that those who want to keep their former family name after marriage can do so, at least in the documents of this university. So I think even if it is a small thing, you should not give up for a small trial or challenge, and if you are always diligent and careful just to find a very small spot and you change it and you may succeed. This kind of attitude is very important. I am really thankful to today's organizer especially and thank you to everyone.