An Overview of the Debate on the African State

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Poverty and other issues associated with development are commonly found in many Asian and African countries. These problems are interwoven with ethnic, religious and political issues, and often lead to incessant conflicts with violence. In order to find an appropriate framework for the conflict resolution, we need to develop a perspective which will fully take into account the wisdom of relevant disciplines such as economics, politics and international relations, as well as that fostered in area studies. Building on the following expertise and networks that have been accumulated in Ryukoku University in the past, the Centre organises research projects to tackle with new and emerging issues in the age of globalisation. It aims to disseminate the results of our research internationally, through academic publications and engagement in public discourse.

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1 Introduction

A variety of arguments have been put forward concerning “the state in Africa.” An overall review of the debate on the African state is given here with reference to the general theory of the African state.

1.1 Concept of the State

It is not easy to define the concept of “the African state” from among the many and diverse concepts of the state. While basing a definition on the concept of the state as generally perceived in political science studies, an elucidation of the “Africaness” of the African state is also sought. Young and Turner (1985) give six factors of the concept of the state as territoriality, sovereignty, nation, institutions of rule, a legal system, and an idea. Young (1988a) gives seven factors by dividing institutions of rule into judicially equivalent units of rule within the international community and institutions of rule. Zartman (ed. 1995) points out that the basic characteristics of a state are a population, territory, a governmental apparatus, and authority. These theories of the state are the conventional and existing theories concerning state factors.

In the case of the theory of the African state, the focus has been placed on the relationship between the state and society (civil society). Azarya (1988) points out in “Reordering State-Society Relations” that though the state is an organization within society, it is distinguished from the myriad of other organizations in seeking predominance over them and in aiming to institute binding rules regarding activities of other organizations. This has become Azarya’s definition of the African state. Bratton (1989) adopts Azarya’s definition, and Villalón (1995) follows the definition of the state proposed by Azarya and adopted by Bratton. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Chazan et al. eds. 1999) organizes three approaches to the understanding of the state, namely, the organic approach, the configurational approach, and the interactive approach, and emphasizes the third approach, namely, where the nature of transactions between state institutions and social groups are stressed, especially in that the colonial legacy forms the structural foundation of the African state.

Therefore, how the concept of the African state should be defined is dependent upon how Africaness is perceived, having firstly emphasized the relatedness of the state and society. Ekeh (1975), pointing out that the post-colonial present has been fashioned by their colonial past, emphasizes African “uniqueness,” namely, the Africaness provided by the colonial experience. Chabal (1996) argues for the need to study the
particular — that is, what is “African” in African politics, or Africaness — by means of universal concepts.

1.2 Emergence of the Theory of the State

In the field of studies of African politics, serious study of the African state began at the beginning of the 1980s. The background to the emergence of the theory of the African state in the early 1980s is due to the following circumstances.

Firstly, there was a new trend in research into African politics in Europe and the US. Jackson and Rosberg presented their paper “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist” (Jackson and Rosberg 1982a; Kohli ed. 1986) at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 1981, and published Personal Rule in Black Africa (Jackson and Rosberg 1982b). With this, they touched off the discussion on the theory of the African state in the US. At the same time, research into “politics from below” (le politique par le bas) began in France in 1980, and the quarterly journal Politique Africaine was inaugurated in 1981. This was a movement to consider African politics not from the state but from “below” (society), but it became the trigger for the reverse perspective in order to see the African state.

Secondly, there was the debate between the international financial institutions and the various African governments concerning the role of the state in economic development. From the end of the 1970s through to the beginning of the 1980s, development policies of African governments had been discussed in the context of causation of the stagnancy of the African economy.

The appearance of the second period of the debate on the theory of the African state in the mid-1990s arose from reflections on the phenomenon of the “retrogression” of the state brought about by increasing conflicts. In particular, the collapse of the state was discussed, the state theory with negative images such as the failed state, the collapsed state, the shadow state, the criminal state, and the disorder state erupted onto the scene, overwhelming the debate on the theory of the African state with pessimism. Western policy-oriented researches on how to deal with the problems such as democratization and conflict resolution became prevalent.

1.3 Trends in the Theory of the State

mid-1980s into two approaches: leadership theory and Marxist theory.

In the 1990s, African states had been forced to change by democratization and increasing conflicts. In “The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect” (1990), Doornbos marshals the theory of the African state under three debate issues: the state and politics, the state and society, and the state and development. He then examines factors of the international community and civil society that influence the African state, and concludes that this search parallels the emergence of numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) intent on capturing some of the political space in the non-state sphere. In Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation (1992), Chabal arranges the theory of the state into three approaches, namely, the developmental notion, the Marxism notion, and the over-developed notion. Chabal points out that the notion of the over-developed state emerged in reaction to the shortcomings of the other notions: the notion of the developmental state was thought to be out of touch with reality, and the Marxist notion of the state was clearly limited due to its over-straightforwardness.

The theory of the African state in the Francophone regions entered a new stage in the early 1980s. In “L’Afrique et la science politique” (1991b), Médard rejects the 1960’s political developmentalist theory (the first wave) and the 1970’s dependency theory (the second wave), and analyzes the emergence of the theory of “politics from below” (the third wave). Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire, jointly edited by Bayart, Mbembe, and Toulabour (eds. 1992) is an anthology of papers on research into the state theory of “politics from below” in France. Hountondji asserts, in “The Crisis of the State in Africa” (1992), that Marxism is still the most appropriate theoretical tool on the Third World for understanding the genesis and complexity of inequality.

The work that symbolically marks the beginning of the second period is “Rethinking Theories of the State” (1996) presented by Hyden. Hyden reviews the approach to the state in the Third World and Africa up until that time, and concludes that there has been a major shift from emphasis on political economy of the state to political culture and current theories in comparative politics which deal more with rules and regimes, identity and institutions.

A new evolution in the theory of the African state has appeared from the end of the 1990s through to the beginning of the 2000s. Evans (1997) points out that the role of the state is as important as ever, and that it is critical to shed light on the stateness of the African state. In the co-edited volume The African State at a Critical Juncture (Villalón and Huxtable eds. 1998), Villalón offers the analysis that the vulnerability of the African state, which now stands at a critical juncture, shows itself in five different faces, namely, the client state, the personalized state, the centralized state, the prebendal state, and the extractive state. He suggests that it is necessary to restructure society and politics in the African state. In “La science politique africaniste et le statut théorétique de l’État africain” (1998), Tshiyembé asserts that Bayart’s theory of “l’État politique du ventre”
(politics-of-the-belly state) and Médard’s theory of “l’État patrimonial” have both failed, and proposes the revival of the theory of the post-colonial state based on the theory of “l’État multinational.”


2 Formation and Crisis of the State

2.1 Formation of the State

Since many of the African countries gained their independence after being colonies, the relationship with colonialism lies at the basis of the existence of the African state. However, as stated in The African Political Dictionary (1984) edited by Phillips, states existed in Africa before the colonial age. In “The West African State in Historical Perspective” (1994), Bathily organizes the history of the formation of state in West Africa into five stages (types): the primary state, the military-merchant state, the predatory state, the colonial state, and the bureaucratic state of the post-colonial period. Chronologically, the African state can be divided into three phases: the “pre-colonial state” before colonial rule, the “colonial state” under colonial rule, and the “post-colonial state” since independence. In “The African Colonial State and its Political Legacy” (1988a), Young shows three stages for the colonial state, namely, construction, institutionalization, and decolonization.
2.2 The Nation-State

Having gained independence, the former colonial state of Africa is generally perceived as a “nation-state” moving towards the formation of the state and nation. Therefore, from the 1960s to the 1970s there was not much discussion concerning the nation-state in Africa. The title of Rivkin’s book was *Nation-Building in Africa* (1969). Discussions of the crisis of the nation-state began when the African nation-state plunged into crisis in the 1980s (Person 1981, Chabal 1983). In their co-edited book, Mazrui and Tidy (eds. 1984) grasp the formation of the nation-state as a merger of statehood and nationhood, and conclude that the challenge facing African countries is to go in search of the formation of a nationhood. Mawhood (1989) argues that nation-building lagged behind state formation, and that the plural state and political pluralism were therefore important.

A contribution concerning the theory of the nation-state is Davidson’s *The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (1992). Davidson points out that, according to Ahluwalia’s explanation, “the black man’s burden” has its roots in the bequeathed nation-state and nationalism, the authoritarian nature of colonial rule was bequeathed to African nations, and the institutions of the nation-state have thwarted development. Ishemo (1995) supports Davidson’s discussion, particularly the argument concerning the resuscitation of the nation-state through the reclaiming of history.

The book co-edited by Olukoshi and Laakso (eds. 1996), *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa*, supports Davidson’s analysis that nation-states in Africa were unsuccessful because they took European models rather than basing themselves on Africa’s own history and experience. Laakso proposes the need to address substantive issues connected with the power structure of the nation-state. Similarly, as mentioned by Ahluwalia, Ake (1996) expresses the view that the independent African state that has inherited the absolutism and arbitrariness of the colonial state is a simulacrum of the colonial state. Dixon (2002) reminisces that the English School account has failed to conceptualize the emergence of the Westphalian-style state as the singularly dominant form of political community in post-colonial Africa.

2.3 The Neo-Colonial State and the Re-Colonial State

Although African countries have achieved political independence, the independence is a token one, and is insufficient. In particular, the maintained colonial economic structures have not allowed African countries to be economically independent and kept them in a continuing colonialist situation. According to this view, the theory of neo-colonialism (Kawabata 1980), these African countries are called “neo-colonial states.” Leys published a volume entitled *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism* (1975). Mafeje’s paper in the co-edited *African Social Studies: A Radical Reader* (Mafeje; Gutkind and Waterman eds. 1977) points out that a formally independent country, owing to the fragility of its economic structures, can
easily be turned into a neo-colony by international finance-capital. Similarly, a paper by Williams (1977) analyzes “class relations in a neo-colony” in the case of Nigeria.

Discussions of the neo-colonial state in the 1980s and after are as follows, with each author analyzing the neo-colonial state by focusing on the specific topic. Shivji (1980) discusses the class character of the neo-colonial state, Lonsdale (1981) discusses neo-colonies, Martin (1982) discusses neo-colonial relations between Europe and Africa, Patel (1985) discusses the British colonial system and African states, Reed (1987) discusses neo-colonial relations between France and Gabon, Nzongola-Ntaraja (1987) discusses the neo-colonial state and the dependent capitalist state within the world capitalist system, Charney (1987) discusses political power and class relations in the neo-colonial African state, and Meyns and Nabudere (eds. 1989) discuss the one-party system in the neo-colonial state.


The theory of the re-colonial state emerged around 1993. Concretely, Mozambique was defined as a “re-colonial state.” Saul (1993) analyzes the FRELIMO state of Mozambique as a state of re-colonization after the revolution. Plank (1993) provides the analysis that the status of Mozambique has been characterized as a new form of colonialism, that is, re-colonization. Grahams (1993) concludes that to resolve local development issues of the grass-roots level was crucial in order to find a way out of this predicament. Saul (2001) appraises Plank’s assertion and points out that the use of the term “re-colonization” was evocative for explaining the way in which Mozambique’s sovereignty had been subordinated. On the other hand, Pitcher (1996) criticizes the theory of the re-colonial state, arguing that it was premature to classify this as the rebirth of colonialism, namely, re-colonization.

Callaghgy (1995), concerning dependence on external actors, particularly, the IMF and the World Bank, depicts this as post-neocolonialism or new neo-colonialism. Mazrui (1994) proposes the idea of “benign colonization,” or a new form of mandatory administration of the old League of Nations, rekindling persistent ideas of re-colonization which have existed in European countries. Pfaff (1995), advocating the resurrection of the trusteeship system, insists that the Western nations have the moral obligation and the colonial expertise to give wiser succor, and should go back into
Africa and implement a “new colonialism.” Ayittey (1997) points out that the re-colonization is politically unacceptable and economically impractical; it is Africans who must save Africa. Although a re-colonial-like situation exists, advocating re-colonization under the trusteeship system is anachronistic.

2.4 The Imported State and the Grafted State

African countries inherited colonial states, so their origins were not of their own making. Yet it cannot be ignored that in some aspects these states are based on the history and traditions of African society. Discussions have unfolded as to whether the character of the post-colonial state is exogenous or endogenous. The argument has its origins in the theory of the “imported state” or the “transplanted state” advocated by Badie (1992) and Badie and Birnbaum (1979). Bayart (1991a, 1991b, 1996b) criticizes the theory of the “imported state” (l’État importé), arguing that the African state is transplanted from Europe, and proposes the theory of the “grafted state” (le greffe de l’État).

Englebert (1997) claims that, according to Bayart’s argument of historicité (historicity), the “imported state” was grafted on, with the “imported state” and local power becoming hybridized. Then, the imported institutions were endogenized in the long-run history of societies, and the role of the imported nature of institutions ends up playing a relatively minor role. Contrastingly, Dia’s analysis (1995) is that the institutional crisis affecting economic management in Africa is a crisis of structural disconnect between formal institutions transformed from the outside and indigenous institutions born of traditional African countries; that institutional reconciliation is the key to solving the crisis; and that the solution lies neither in formalizing informal institutions nor in informalizing formal institutions, but in reconciling and encouraging convergence between adapted formal institutions and renovated informal, indigenous institutions.

On the other hand, Englebert (1997) criticizes Bayart’s argument of historicité, arguing that it blinds him to the reality. In contrast, he criticizes Dia’s argument as being an excessive generalization, putting forth the discussion that Dia falls back into the modernization pitfall of forced change imposed from the outside; it is a mistake to see the modern as dynamic and the traditional as static; and indigenous African institutions are themselves in constant evolution. Englebert concludes that the contemporary state in Sub-Saharan Africa is not African; that it descends from arbitrary colonial administrative units designed as instruments of domination, oppression and exploitation; that these states have been transformed, adopted, adapted, and endogenized, yet, their origin remains exogenous; and that the African state is not a state. Sindjoun (2002), arguing against cultural relativism, criticizes the view that the model of the Western state cannot be adapted to non-Western societies.

By contrast, Mamdani (1996) concludes that the core agenda that African states
faced at independence was a three-fold one: deracializing civil society, detribalizing the Native Authority, and developing the economy; the task undertaken with greatest success was deracialization; the task undertaken with the least success was democratization; and that in the absence of democratization, the more civil society was deracialized, the more it came to be tribalized. Mamdani insists that the most salient feature of contemporary African states lies in the legacy of colonial forms, which is known as the theory of the “colonial legacy state.” Contrary to the claims of Davidson (1992), Harsch (1997) interprets Mamdani’s assertion as meaning that the European colonialists did not implant their own nation-state model, but created multiethnic states in which the rights of the indigenous people were determined by their “tribal” affiliation.

2.5 The Post-Colonial State

Analysis concerning both the nation-state and the neo-colonial state involves discussion of the “post-colonial state.” Ahluwalia (2001) reviews discussions concerning the post-colonial state, and concludes that post-colonial theory offers a way to break down the tyranny of the structures of power which continue to entrap the post-colonial subject, and that Africa has been subjected to a history of analogy in which it is compared to other parts of the world, notably Europe. Young (2004) proclaims the “end of the post-colonial state in Africa,” and concludes that the post-colonial moment appears to have passed. Meanwhile, the theory of “post-colonialism” in a broader sense than that concerning the discussions on the post-colonial state has been unfolding. The theory of the state of the so-called post-colonial school falls primarily into social thought theory rather than political science theory. Abrahamsen (2003) concludes that the post-colonial theory is irrelevant to the study of contemporary African politics and society, and argues for a more constructive dialogue between African studies and post-colonial approaches.

2.6 The Neo-Patrimonial State

The concept of neo-patrimonialism was founded by Eisenstadt (1973) in the early 1970s. Following that, mostly in analyses of West African countries, the notion of (neo-)patrimonialist politics was explored, and a state which was patrimonialized became known as the “neo-patrimonial state” or the “neo-patrimonialistic state.”

Médard (1982, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c), distancing himself slightly from the theory of “politics from below,” advocates the idea that the theory of the neo-patrimonial state could be applied to the analysis of the whole of Africa. According to Médard (1995), the African state is not a patrimonial state, but a patrimonialized state, and this is why it is better to call it neo-patrimonial; patrimonialism first appears with political differentiation when a patrimonial chief exercises his authority beyond his own domestic group, his “oikos,” over people who are no longer relatives or servants; both
the bureaucratization and the patrimonialization of the state proceeded together; and this
patrimonialization of the state has brought about a “neo-patrimonial state,” a kind of
hybrid of patrimonialism and bureaucracy.

Van de Walle (1994) designates it as the neo-patrimonial state — found in
contemporary Africa — in which patrimonial logic coexists with the development of
bureaucratic administration and at least the pretense of legal-rational forms of state
legitimacy. Bratton and van de Walle (1994) give the analysis that the distinctive
institutional hallmark of African regimes is neo-patrimonialism; in neo-patrimonial
regimes, the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage; and that
while neo-patrimonial practice can be found in all polities, it is the core feature of
politics in Africa. Sandbrook (1986) discusses “personal rule,” a particular mode of
patrimonial governance. Van de Walle (2003) analyzes presidentialism and clientelism
in Africa’s emerging party systems.

Analyses from the perspective of neo-patrimonialism have developed in political
research on African countries. Jua (1995) analyzes Cameroon, and Richards (1996) and
Smith (1997) analyzes Sierra Leone in terms of the theory of the neo-patrimonial state.
Berman (1998) calls pervasive patron-client relations in post-colonial societies the
politics of “uncivil nationalism.” Alexander (1997) provides an analysis of the authority
of the traditional chief in Mozambique, and expresses concern over the possibility of
chiefs becoming a coercive and self-interested extension of the state. Taylor (1999)
analyzes neo-patrimonialism in Zimbabwe in terms of the failure of middle-class
development. Hyden (Hyden et al. eds. 2000) explains the characteristics of
neo-patrimonialism in terms of unaccountability, patriarchy and ascription. Jua (2002)
gives an introduction to the role of the traditional ruler in Cameroon.

Young (1999) distances himself slightly from the theory of neo-patrimonialism and
introduces the concept of “patrimonial autocratic state.” Tshiyembe (2001) criticizes
Médard’s argument, which attributes all problems to neo-patrimonialism. Although all
African states have neo-patrimonialist tendencies to some extent, it is nevertheless true
that African states cannot be examined in terms of the theory of the neo-patrimonial
state alone.

2.7 The Politicized State

Because African states are excessively large and politically over-developed
compared with the scale of their societies, they are known as the “over-developed state”
or the “over-politicized state.” Leys (1976) reevaluates the “over-developed
post-colonial state.” Diamond (1987) expresses this as the “swollen state,” since the
particular bane of African national development has not been the emergence of a
dominant class, but rather its often parasitic character as a political class feeding off the
revenue of a swollen state. Diamond argues that the over-sized, over-owing,
over-regulating African state may serve as the basis for dominant-class formation. Marenin (1987) cites the arguments of Kasfir (1983a) pointing out the “centrality of the African state” and those of Ake (1981) pointing out the “over-politicization of social life,” and then defines the state as the “managerial state.” Osaghae (1989) asserts that the theory of the “over-developed state” formulated by Alavi (1972) is highly applicable to Africa.

Sangmpam (1992, 1995), who developed the theory of the “over-politicized state,” puts forward an analysis that the major link between pseudo-capitalism and the over-politicized state is established. Jeffries (1993) argues that the over-development of the state was a major cause of economic decline; and that an important precondition is the development of more efficient, more autonomous state machines and the development of more efficient and capable government bureaucracy. Goldsmith (1999) reconsiders the “over-grown state,” and concludes that the history of public administration in most of Africa raises doubts that rational-legal systems will replace patrimonial ones in many places soon; and that rational-legal administrative systems may not be a sufficient condition for sustained economic growth and social improvement. Although various terms have been used, since the African state has the characteristic of being over-politicized, there are few objections to the theory of the “over-politicized state.”

2.8 The Weak State

It is often said that African states are “weak.” The theory of the “weak state” was led by Jackson and Rosberg’s article “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist” (1982a). The conclusion from Myrdal’s book *Asian Drama* (1968) was incorporated into their theory. Reno developed his own theory of the weak state. Reno’s article “African Weak States and Commercial Alliances” (1997) refers to Migdal’s book *Strong Societies and Weak States* (1988), and analyzes the formation of commercial alliances brought about by privatization and militarization in post Cold War weak states. Further, Reno (1999, 2004) analyzes the privatization of sovereignty and the “shadow state” in the weak state, and Reno (2000a) analyzes non-state actors in the weak state and the privatization of interstate relations. Ihonvbere (1994) defines the post-colonial state as the “irrelevant state” where the goals of nationhood have not been attained.

The theory of the weak state can be comprehended as a general idea. Since the central concept of “weakness” is not always defined clearly, a “weakness” of the theory of the weak state emerges from strict discussions of the definition such as, what is weakness, by what standard are strength and weakness to be judged, and what distinguishes weak from soft. Hyden (Hyden et al. eds. 2000) points out that Migdal (1988) suggests that there is a positive correlation between a weak state and strong society — i.e., the weaker the former, the stronger the latter, but Migdal’s thesis is not sufficient for understanding African politics. In contrast, Enemuo (2000) states that
Migdal posits that the strength of a state is measured by its capacity and capability to penetrate its society; judged against this parameter, the inescapable verdict is that African states are weak, because they are in varying degrees out of sync with society.

Harbeson (2001) insists that where the very existence of the state is very much a dependent variable, the importance of recognizing and specifying the interdependence of state formation, democracy and conflict management processes becomes more apparent. Reno (2001) points out that even the weak state has juridical sovereignty and can continue to exist within the current state system. Ahluwalia (2001) contends that a strong state tends towards dictatorship, while a weak state collapses into clientelism.

Detecting confusion in the arguments, Richard Jackson (2002) — not R.H. Jackson of “Jackson and Rosberg” — reviews the arguments concerning the theory of the weak state. He suggests that some of the characteristics of the weak state are unconsolidated or non-existent democracies, lack of national identities, institutional incapacity and inability, and external vulnerability to international actors and forces. Diverse interpretations have appeared concerning the “weak state.”

2.9 The Failed State

The weakness of the African state developed into failure and collapse of the state in the 1990s. The weak state of Africa exacerbated those symptoms and the so-called “failed state” and “collapsed state” emerged. Diverse theories of the failed state were extended. Helman and Ratner (1992-1993) propose innovative policies “to save the failed state.” Mazrui (1995) discusses the failed state and political collapse in terms of conflict resolution in Africa. Zartman (ed. 1995) edited the volume *Collapsed States*.

Widner (1995), who unfolds a robust explication of the failed state, sketches the patterns of performance among countries and inquires into the origins of deteriorating institutional performance. He further argues that state failure does not necessarily lead to state collapse; state collapse and state failure may have related origins, but they are not the same; and that not all failed states in Africa collapse. Consequently, the collapsed state came to be perceived as a more deteriorated form of the failed state. Gros (1996), who points out that the failed state is not a phenomenon limited to Africa and can be found in any part of the world, investigates a global taxonomy of the failed state.

Forrest focuses on the fact, in “State Inversion and Non-state Politics” (1998), that the contradictions of the world and society have been transposed, or in other words inverted onto the African state, and analyzes the mechanism of the failed state in terms of the theory of the “inverted state.” Forrest suggests that the phenomenon under discussion on the African state in decline may best be understood as reflecting a multi-causal process of the “state inversion” in which states decay in varying stages; through the process of state inversion, government institutions become increasingly dysfunctional and end up turning inward toward themselves rather than outward toward
society; and the basic characteristic of an inverted state is that the bureaucratic infrastructure of the state is unable to perform even the most fundamental policy-making and policy-implementing functions.

In conclusion, Forrest identifies four principal factors to explain state inversion in Africa: first, a fundamental alteration of the international balance of power after the end of the Cold War, second, the ultra-privatization of the state, third, the declining integrity and coherence of the military, and fourth, the increasing assertion of subnational movements and rebellions.

2.10 The Collapsed State

The theory of the “collapsed state,” which emerged from the mid-1990s, began with Zartman’s presentation of August 1994, entitled “Collapsed States in Africa” (1997) and the volume edited by Zartman entitled Collapsed States (Zartman ed. 1995). The gist (from the introduction and the conclusion) of Zartman’s Collapsed States is the following. Concerning the concept of state collapse, Zartman defines that states collapse because they can no longer perform the functions required for them to pass as states; the state is the authoritative political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory; that this definition focuses on three functions (the state as the sovereign authority, the state as the institution, and the state as the security guarantor); and that collapse means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed.

Concerning the process of state collapse, Zartman offers a comment on the absence of clear turning points. Zartman points out that the slippery slope and the downward trend are the marks of state collapse. Then, Zartman identifies five of these ultimate signposts. Concerning the difference between the failed state and the collapsed state, Zartman defines the failed state that has lost its basic function as a state as being a collapsed state.

A collection of papers marking the outcome of the “Harvard University Failed States Project” was published as the two volumes edited by Rotberg (ed. 2003, 2004). The latter volume, When States Fail, classifies the failed state into four categories, namely, the weak state, the failing state, the failed state, and the collapsed state. Rotberg defines the failed state a being tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions; the collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of the failed state.

Several objections have been raised concerning the theory of the collapsed state and the failed state. The African State at a Critical Juncture (1998), the volume co-edited by Villalón and Huxtable, includes analyses which consider reality to be more complex and diverse than Zartman’s model. They argue that African states have not collapsed to such an extent and that the African states in crisis are at a critical juncture between disintegration and reconfiguration. In opposition to Zartman’s characterization of state collapse as a long-term degenerative disease with no clear turning points,
Lemarchand (1997) points out that there is more to it than a slippery slope phenomenon. Lemarchand analyzes three major factors of state erosion, namely, ethnic exclusive policies, population density, and the shrinking of the political bases of state authority. Goldsmith (2000) points out that Africanists have variously described these states as “failed” or “collapsed”; this is unsuitable for identifying trends in a wider region and they should avoid making over-generalization. These criticisms are justified.

3 The State and Politics

3.1 The Authoritarian State and the Democratic State

With the progress of democratization from the 1990s, African countries have entered a process of transition from the “authoritarian state” to the “democratic state.” The issue is how the African state should be perceived during this transitional period. Young (1999) describes African states as semi-democracies, while Joseph (1999) describes them as semi-authoritarian states. Kawabata (2003) classifies them as “democratizing countries.” Endo (2004b), following Ottaway’s (2003) discussion of semi-authoritarian regimes, describes them as states of semi-authoritarianism. These are interpretations of the African state as the “semi-authoritarian state” and the “semi-democratic state.”

3.2 The Personal Rule State and the Presidentialist State

Arguments that African states are governed by one ruler emerged in the early 1980s. This is the theory of the “personal rule state.” Jackson and Rosberg, who developed their theory of the personal rule state in their volume Personal Rule in Black Africa (1982b), classify authoritarian personal rulers into four types, namely, prince, autocrat, prophet and tyrant. Further, Jackson and Rosberg (1984a) analyze personal rule as being an elitist political system; among the most important practices in personal regimes are conspiracy, factional politics and clientelism, corruption, purges and rehabilitations, and succession maneuvers. Jackson and Rosberg (1994) analyze the political economy of personal rule, the political diseconomy, and the personally appropriated state.

Kasfir (1983a) distnguishes personal rule from patronialism, and concludes that not all personal rulers operate patronial structures. Decalo (1985, 1989) referring to the three personal dictators, namely, Idi Amin, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, and F. Macias Nguema, points out that personal rule and authoritarianism are different; personal rule need not be authoritarian, and develops the theory of the personal dictatorships. Decalo’s argument is not a theory of the state, but it does follow the analysis of Roth (1968) and of Jackson and Rosberg (1982b). Roth (1968) points out that personal rule should not be mistaken for “authoritarianism.” Decalo’s argument can therefore be said in a broad sense to belong to the category of the theory of the “personal rule state.”
Sandbrook (1986) understands personal rule as a particular mode of the “patrimonial governance,” and points out that personal rule, as an ideal type, comprises three interrelated traits: the strongman, clientelism, and a personally loyal armed forces.

Since the position of the personal ruler is generally the president, presidential authoritarianism or the theory of the “presidentialist state” has been proposed. Nyong’o (1986, 1989) mentions Kenya as being a state with a presidential authoritarian system. Ayittey (1997) points out that the state was monopolized and run as a “personal fiefdom” in the “pro-capitalist” country or as “party property” in the “one-party socialist state”; all shared one overriding characteristic: the concentration of both political and economic power in the hands of the state. Van de Walle (2003) states that the “presidentialist state” is personally ruled by a president, or in other words, is the state of presidentialism in which power is personalized and centralized around the president. But van de Walle does not use the term “presidentialist state.”

3.3 The One-Party State and the Socialist State

Many African countries adopted the one party system as their political party system from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, so they were called “one-party states.” In many of these countries, a party supporting the personal ruler, namely the president, was formed. Therefore, the “one-party state” became the “personal rule state” of the president.

Until the mid-1980s, the one-party system seemed to be unshakable. Carter (ed. 1962) concludes that the existence of a dominant or single political party in a number of states is associated not only with stability but also with mass popular support. Ashford (1965) discusses the relationship between the single-party state and personal rule. Willetts (1975) introduces the politics of Uganda as the one-party state at the time of the Obote regime. At the end of the 1980s, the one-party system became destabilized and each country was forced to reconsider its political party system. Wanyande (1988) explains that the ruler, namely the president, had instituted the one-party system so that his control of state power would not be threatened. Ong’wamuhana (1988) argues that a political party system and democracy are different, in other words, there was a theory of one-party democracy, where the one-party arrangement was seen as a better basis for democracy.

As the Cold War came to an end and democratization began at the beginning of the 1990s, the political party system in many countries shifted from the one-party system to the multi-party system. One country that tried to go in the opposite direction to this trend was Zimbabwe. Mandaza and Sachikonye (eds. 1991) conclude that the one-party state model was anachronistic system. Nyong’o (1992a, 1992b) criticizes apologists supporting the one-party state at the African Association of Political Science (AAPS) in May 1991. Haynes (1992, 1993) discusses the political party system in Africa and Ghana. Mandaza (1994) analyzes the historical and ideological bases of the one-party
state. Mphaisha (1996) paradoxically describes Zambia as being a country which had reintroduced the multi-party politics but where democratization was in retreat. Comprehensive discussions of the theory of the one-party state were published in the late 1990s, when the one-party state came to be seen as a product of the past. Kanyinga (1998) analyzes the process from single-party politics to multi-party politics in Kenya.

Some African countries proclaimed themselves to be socialist (African socialism or scientific socialism), and these were known as socialist one-party states, or the “socialist states.” Generally they were called African socialist states. On the other hand, such countries as Ethiopia that followed Marxism-Leninism were known as the “scientific socialist states.” Saul (1979) discusses socialism and the state in Tanzania. Ottaway and Ottaway, in the volume entitled Afrocommunism (1981), use the terms “Afro-communist state” to describe three socialist states, namely, Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia. In their joint work, Keller and Rothchild (eds. 1987) give an introduction to the emergence of new type of states, namely, the Afro-Marxist regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, Madagascar and Congo.

A common feature of these theories of the socialist state was that they did not strictly clarify the concept of socialism. With the reality of retreat of socialism, facile theories of the socialist state disappeared without the emergence of a comprehensive discussion. An exception was Freund (1998) who correctly sums up the situation by stating that a socialist party building upon the movement of the oppressed emerged nowhere, the ruling parties moved towards the creation of the one-party state, and working class organizations suffered. Totally outside of these contexts, Kawabata (1981) declares the end of (the theory of) African socialism.

3.4 The Corporatist State

At about the time when the limits to African socialism were becoming apparent, some people hoped that corporatism could be a new possible route to overcome neo-colonial rule. Shaw (1982) proposes the theory of the “corporatist state” to progress beyond neo-colonialism, classifying varieties of Africa’s “corporatist state” into three types, namely, bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism, populist corporatism, and collectivist corporatism. Shaw (1988), asking whether the future state of Africa may be defined as capitalist, communist or corporatist, answers that the most familiar response in Africa is likely to be a distinctive, indigenous variant of corporatism.

However, there were problems in terms of how to define this corporatism. In Corporatism in Africa (1989), Nyang’oro and Shaw conclude that corporatist elements will continue to remain an important component of the political ideologies of African leaders. Mozaffar (1989) argues that the notion and incidence of corporatism remain highly variable, and that corporatist elements continue to remain. Robinson (1991) anatomizes varieties of corporatism and classifies corporatism into four types: liberal corporatism, populist corporatism, bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism, and
neo-traditional corporatism. The theory of corporatist state had limitations as the theory of African state.

3.5 The Conflict State and the Genocidal State

Diverse expressions such as the “conflict state” and the “genocidal state” are used to describe the African state facing conflicts. The theory of the “genocidal state” emerged as a typical theory of the conflict state. Kuper’s article “The Genocidal State: Overviews” (1990) provides a general review of the genocidal state and discusses four types, namely, the endemic genocidal state, the ethnocratic (Kuper’s coinage, it means ethnic consolidation and monopoly of power) genocidal state, the theocratic genocidal state, and genocides of marginal and hostage groups. Lemarchand (1990) analyzes the genocidal violence of the minority against the majority in Burundi and discusses the genocidal state. According to the analysis of Longman (1999), the genocide in Rwanda was organized by officials and carried out using the instruments of the state.

3.6 The Criminal State and the Disorder State

Extremely pessimistic theories of the state such as the “anarchical state,” the “criminal state,” the “disorder state,” and so on were discussed in the 1990s. Kaplan (1994) reports that a situation of anarchy, where there was no governments and no politics, was emerging in West African states. The criminal state means that the state itself is the scene of, or the main actor of, the criminal activity. In Chapter 1 of Bayart’s co-edited *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (Bayart et al. eds. 1999, 1997), entitled “From Kleptocracy to the Felonious State?” five symptoms of the African crisis are given, the process of criminalization is explored, six indicators of the criminalization of politics are presented, and the fact that African states are associated with international networks of organized crime is defined as the criminalization of the state. Although the theory of the “criminal state” was not originally proposed as the theory of the African state, in conclusion, they analyze the criminalization of the state, namely, the “criminal state.”

The “disorder state” means that disorder is utilized as a political instrument, and does not mean the state concerned is a disordered state. Chabal and Daloz discuss in their book *Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument* (1999), that although the “disorder state” cannot work rationally, disorder does work rationally, and how the political instrumentalization of disorder is utilized for political elites to misappropriate the state, because the very inefficiency of the state is profitable to the political elites. Although they do not use the term “disorder state,” they analyze the political institutionalization of disorder in African states. The theories of the criminal state and the disorder state reflect irritation over the fact that institutionalized states on the Weberian model have not been established in Africa. Thus these are bedeviled by Eurocentrism, represent a kind of the theory of the “retrograde state,” and are extremely
pessimistic theories of the state.

3.7 The Juridical State and the Empirical State

Jackson and Rosberg (1982a), answering to the question “the serious empirical weakness and vulnerabilities of some African states have not let to enforced jurisdictional change. Why not? How can the persistence of Africa’s weak states be explained?” express the following. The “empirical state,” in which an effective government and a permanent population are attributes of the state, is different from the “juridical state,” which is both a creature and a component of the international society of states, and its attributes are territory and independence. They argue that juridical statehood is more important than empirical statehood in accounting for the persistence of the state in Africa. Jackson and Rosberg (1985) also point out that juridical statehood was acquired before a foundation of empirical statehood had been established, and that the internal legitimacy and capability of most Sub-Saharan countries was not substantial at the time of independence.

Further, Jackson and Rosberg (1986) clarify by noting that many so-called states in Africa are seriously deficient in the essentials of statehood, and exist primarily by means of international legitimacy, and so are nominal states. With the theory of sovereignty incorporated into these discussions, in Quasi-States (1990), Jackson defines states in the Third World whose negative sovereignty is recognized by the international society, but whose positive sovereignty is not established, as the “quasi-state.” Negative sovereignty can be defined as freedom from outside interference, a formal-legal condition. Positive sovereignty presupposes capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters.

Jackson and Rosberg’s analysis provoked debates. In Africa and the International System (1996), while introducing Jackson’s analysis, Clapham describes the dichotomy, which scholars in international relations have been apt to make between “real” states (developed powers) and “fictitious” states (found in other parts of the world), as misleading; it would be more appropriate to place all states on a continuum, according not only to the level of effective government power over the states’ territory, but also to the extent to which the “idea” of each state is both shared and implemented. Clapham concludes critically that quasi-statehood provides no bridge across which African or other states can pass in reasonable confidence from their post-colonial origins to the “empirical statehood” that rests on national integration and a set of viable political and economic institutions.

Boone (1998b), citing Jackson and Rosberg’s argument that superficial forms of juridical statehood, rather than the deep underpinning of empirical statehood, defines Africa’s political map, and testing this argument in case studies, and concludes that the empirical bases of statehood appear to be deeper and broader than Jackson and Rosberg’s argument suggested. Endo (2004a) takes note of Boone’s (2003) viewpoint
on the political topography of the African state, territorial authority and institutional choice, applying it to the problem of subnationalism in Lower Casamance in Senegal. Rothchild and Harbeson (2000) discuss the linkage between African state weakness and state system frailty, and point out that as the contagion of disorder spreads, even the well-functioning African states become entrapped by the continent’s growing insecurity.

3.8 The Sovereign State

The discussion of the juridical state and the empirical state has relevance to the concept of state sovereignty. It has generally been thought that African countries achieved independence, gained national sovereignty, and then after the Cold War that national sovereignty faltered. Wallace-Bruce (1985) clarifies that Africa had various independent states on the eve of colonialism; the Eurocentric view that Africa was devoid of state-organization during the pre-colonial period is not supported by evidence; and that when African states began to achieve independence, they were reverted to sovereignty. This is a justifiable argument. Rothchild (1996) presents the analysis that with the end of the Cold War, old principles of international behavior are changing rapidly; as a consequence, today’s African leaders appear increasingly inclined to allow regional and global multilateral organizations wide scope in intervening in threatening internal conflicts. It has become necessary to alter the thinking towards national sovereignty.

Thinking on national sovereignty has an impact upon African regional institutions. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) adhered to the principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty. Gomes (1996) points out that national sovereignty is an accepted principle of international law that is held sacrosanct by the OAU member states. But the establishment of the African Union (AU) forced a change in the thinking on national sovereignty. Kawabata (2003) points out that the AU has the right to intervene in a member state and impose sanctions on a member state, which means that member states forfeit a part of their national sovereignty and transfer it to the regional institutions.

The theory of the “sovereign state” has a bearing on the discussion of how the content of sovereignty should be perceived. Ekeh (1997) distinguishes national sovereignty into “state sovereignty” as the freedom of the state from the former colonial powers and outside forces, and “people’s sovereignty,” and puts forward the analysis that the greater assault has been on the people's sovereignty by state functionaries. Endo (2004a) examines Krasner’s theory of sovereignty, in which sovereignty has four elements, namely, domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty, and explains that the so-called quasi-state theory was a discussion that focused on sovereignty in terms of elements of international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty.
4 The State and Society

4.1 The State and Civil Society

Bayart (1983) describes the image that civil society seeks to counteract the totalizing tendencies of the state. Booth (1987) reviews an outline of argument on the state versus civil society. Azarya and Chazan (1987) point out that it is necessary to focus on the relationship between the state and society, in particular, the mechanism of disengagement of society from the state or the societal reaction to the state.

Azarya (1988), in an introduction to Rothchild and Chazan’s co-edited volume *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa* (eds. 1988), defines incorporation as the process whereby large segments of the population associate with the state and take part in its activities in order to share its resources; disengagement is the tendency to withdraw from the state and keep at a distance from its channels as a hedge against its instability and dwindling resource base. Studying the various facets of the state-society relations, Azarya presents a framework for examination of the relationship of the “precarious balance” between the state and society as a research agenda.

In “Beyond the State” (1989), Bratton favors a definition that the state is an organization within society, and suggests focusing on civil society. Markovitz (1998) describes the argument taking the relationship between the state and society in Africa to be a “precarious balance” as involving a compulsive concentration on civil society, and proposes that by thinking in terms of the intertwining of the state and society instead of picturing a precarious balance, we can better understand what happened and what is happening in Africa.

Crook (1990) compares the state, civil society and institutional efficacy in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Rothchild (1994) sets up four of major state options (populism, majoritarian democracy, elite power sharing, and corporatism), comprising a combination of the extent of societal participation (total and partial) and the state control of process (total and partial), as the structural outline of the state-society relations. Lemarchand (1992) discusses “uncivil state and civil societies.”

There is an argument of the “state-in-society” where the state is seen as an organization within society that interacts with other organizations. Chazan (1994) examines the “state-in-society” framework, and points out that state formation and the emergence of civil society are related but not identical processes; and that a state-in-society framework requires that at least as much attention be devoted to the study of the crystallization of civil society as to the consolidation of the state as an organization within society that claims to make binding rules for all its members. Bratton (1994) argues that, of all organizations, the state is the largest, most formal, and most powerful; but that the state is only one form of organization among many; it is an organization within society that coexists and interacts with other formal and informal political organizations. Englebert (1996) presents the analysis that the unsteady state of
Burkina Faso was caused by colonization and independence, a poor fit between the state and institutions of societies.

As the discussion on democratization and civil society proceeded, there emerged arguments expressing concern that the formation of civil society tended to weaken the state. Kasfir (1998, 2003) considers civil society to consist of non-state organizational activity, and then points out that because of the paradoxical position of the state in civil society, the problem of creating civil society organizations that are powerful enough to force the state into democratic reform might also weaken it severely; a broader strategy of governance that takes into account both building civil society and assisting political institutions is more likely to contribute to democracy. Kasfir warns that scholars and donors need to rethink the assumptions on which they expect civil society to contribute to democracy.

Hansen and Twaddle (eds. 1998) give an introduction to the case of Uganda, where NGOs have been used to supplement the government’s capacity, which means that the performance of NGOs has brought about a retreat of the state. Ahluwalia (2001) points out that a crucial consequence of the emergence of the NGO sector is that considerable funds from external aid donors have been diverted to NGOs and away from the state; this inevitably has weaken the capacity of the African state. Neocosmos (2003) proposes that what is needed is to build a new relationship between the state and citizen; the basis for such an alternative must be a popular-democratic nationalism constructed in opposition to a state nationalism. The formation of civil society without a weakening of the state is required for the democratization of politics in Africa.

4.2 The Soft State and the Hard State

There have been many discussions of the “soft state” and the “hard state.” However, there is no precise definition of the “soft state” and the “hard state,” and the concepts vary depending on the authors.

Myrdal (1968) describes the “soft state” in Asia, which has some influence on discussions of the “soft state” in Africa. Hyden (1983) introduces Myrdal’s description, and points out that the soft state phenomenon is particularly harmful in Africa because of the wide scope of the public sector. Referring to Hyden’s description (1983), Scott (1988) points out that the problems of the soft state are corruption, tribalism, nepotism, collusion between civil servants and politicians, and the circumvention of the law and regulations.

Rothchild (Rothchild 1987; Rothchild and Foley 1988) argues that the modern African state can appropriately be characterized as “soft” — i.e. a state limited in its control over society and therefore incapable of implementing its regulations effectively throughout its territory and of achieving its many-faceted goals, and requires policy implications to harden the state.

Forrest (1988) analyzes the “hardness” of the state in Africa, elaborates the sense
of the term “soft state,” and explores four dimensions of the quest for state hardness, that is, first, a measure of structural autonomy from social forces, second, political penetration in the sense of control over local-level structures, third, the extraction of resources from society and peasant agriculture, and fourth, ideological legitimacy to facilitate the achievement of the three goals without resort to coercion. Forrest points out that the African state has not been able to decisively realize its state-building goals and therefore remains to a large extent soft. Forrest’s exposition became an easily comprehensible theory of the soft state.

Despite Forrest’s explication, however, various theories of the soft state were later developed, thus confusing the discussion. Fatton (1989) criticizes the concept of the “soft state,” pointing out that the thesis is mistaken, because it denies the reality of an authoritarian, interventionist, and class-based state. Fatton (1992) insists that the state is never soft; it is always an organ of dominance; to characterize the state as being soft is to miss the class relationships and class struggles. Kandeh (1992) posits that while the “soft” state may be descriptive of the malleability, hegemonic impotence and functional incapacitation of the post-colonial state in Africa, the class functionality of state softness remains ambivalent and problematic, and concludes that the failure of those who wield state power is a failure to optimize the ruling class functionality of their states; it is this preoccupation of the state bourgeoisie that deprive the soft state of any real reproductive dominant class functionality.

Sangmpam (1993) argues that the failure of the soft state paradigm to base its assumptions, descriptions, and explanations on comparisons between the state in Africa and other Third World states is its great weakness; the theory focuses on the decline, or softness, of the state in Africa; and that Africa shares most of its socio-economic features with other Third World countries that are not characterized by the softness of their states; and concludes that the theoretical issue of the state is the underlying pitfall of the soft state paradigm. Chabal (1993) points out that the post-colonial African state, although over-developed, hegemonic and omnipresent, is in fact soft and over-extended. Reviewing these developments, Villalón (1995), firstly reconfirms Forrest’s definition of state “hardness,” then comments that “soft” is the most frequently used to describe the African state; the context in which it is used varies, but the term refers to the weakness vis-à-vis the society; and the state is “soft” because it is largely incapable of achieving the goals posited in its definition. The concepts of the soft state and the hard state are various and confused.

4.3 The State and Ethnicity/Nation

The issue of ethnicity/nation in Africa was formerly treated using the term “nation” (a collection of people demanding a state) in relation to independence, but it has become more common recently to treat it using the term “ethnicity” (a community of people who have a common identity and common fate) in relation to conflict. Jackson and

African states govern plural societies, so historically the theory of the “multiethnic state” and “multinational state” has developed. Lewis (1965) examines how to create good political institutions in a plural society, and explores the conception of a federation, proportional representation and a coalition government as a governance model for a plural society in West Africa. Lijphart (1977) argues for the theory of “consociational democracy,” comprising of grand coalition based on Lewis’ model of plural governance. Tshiyembé (1998) discusses “the theory of the multinational state” (La théorie de l’État multinational). Osaghae (2006) develops the theory of “positive ethnicity” in contrast to the theory of “negative ethnicity.” He asserts that the role of ethnicity is crucial in the reconstitution of the collapsed state; the positive facets of ethnicity should be emphasized.

5 The State and Economy

5.1 The Politics-of-the-Belly State (l’État politique du ventre)

In The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (1993, 1989), Bayart points out that access to the state is the means to accumulate wealth, and describes the state as being the arena of “the politics-of-the-belly” (la politique du ventre). Therefore, this is known as “the politics-of-the-belly state” (l’État politique du ventre). Bayart’s argument had a great influence on the debate of the African state. Bayart (1991a) concludes that the governmentality (gouvernementalité) of the politics-of-the-belly has hemmed in all strategies and institutions which have worked to create modern Africa; simplistic and univocal interpretations such as those of the theory of “dependency” and the theory of “modernization” should be dispensed with; Africa needs to be analyzed in a way that gives more emphasis to historicity, namely, the long-term (longue durée) “historical trajectory,” because the theory of extraneity is no longer valid. Bayart names the stage of the politics-of-the-belly the “rhizome.” Bayart’s analysis is that the African state has its basis in indigenous foundations and institutional processes of colonial origin, thus the state is the part which is above ground and we must recognize the rhizome that is hidden underground.

Debates have been developed concerning the politics-of-the-belly state. Chabal (1996) concludes that the use of the metaphor of “la politique du ventre” is both insightful and mischievous; it is insightful in that it expresses one of the fundamental aspects of African politics; it is mischievous in that it cannot have escaped Bayart that
the implications of the metaphor are double-edged; it certainly does not encompass the full range of the African political experience. Bourmand (1997) argues that Bayart had made the category of the state ambiguous by undervaluing state institutions. In fact, *The State in Africa* hardly mentions the state at all.

Lodge (1998) argues that Bayart’s discussion does not apply to Southern Africa, and points out that the polities of this region have been linked by transnational flows, all of which have been at odds with the “historicity” which to Bayart explains the predominance of the “politics-of-the-belly” to the North. Takougang and Krieger (1998) introduce Mbembe’s analysis (1993) of the Cameroon state based on Bayart’s theory of the politics-of-the-belly. There are some differences in analyses between Bayart and Mbembe, because Mbembe specifies two poles in Cameroon’s politics, namely, soft nationalism and domestic political alliances.

T. Young (1999), not C. Young, critiques *The State in Africa*, arguing that Bayart tells us almost nothing about the state. Ahluwalia (2001) points out that Bayart advocates a governmentality approach; Bayart’s task is to understand the historicity of the post-colonial African state, which can be interpreted as proposing that African politics be understood by taking the perspectives of historicity and governmentality. Tshiyembé (2001) introduces research into corruption in France and criticizes Bayart’s argument, arguing that graft and corruption in the politics-of-the-belly is not a phenomenon limited to Africa alone.

It is difficult to evaluate the theory of the politics-of-the-belly state. Bayart simply gives a representation of it by enumerating a large number of facts and hardly discusses the state itself at all. Thus, although the politics-of-the-belly is definitely one special feature of African politics, it is not clear whether it can be applied to Africa as a whole.

### 5.2 The Resource State and the Corrupt State

The “resource state” does not imply a state with resources; rather, it is the state itself which is the resource. One of the leading analysts of the theory of the “resource state” is Lonsdale (1981), who defines a four part conceptualization of the state, namely, its apparatus, its representative estates, its ideology, and its material base. Lonsdale’s discussion of the state as a “material base” is the first example of the theory of the “resource state.” Szeftel (1982) analyzes that the state is used as a material resource for private ends. Kasfir (1987) argues that the dominant class utilizes the state as a critical resource in the struggle for local interest. Bratton (1989) interprets the state as being a major source of spoils.

Jackson and Rosberg (1994) argue that politics comes down to a struggle for the spoils of the state in a personally appropriated state. Boone (1994) explains that the private appropriation of state resources and the use of state funds to strengthen personal power network were not aberrations, they lay at the very heart of the process by which post-colonial regimes were consolidated. Cruise O’Brien (1996) points out that the state
remains a major source of spoils and one of the only available channels for getting what little there is to get, according to the interpretation by Bratton (1989). Access to the state is the most valued of prizes. Tangri (1998) argues that African capitalist sectors are still economically weak; it is the state that is the largest employer and investor; and African state leaders remain a major source of resources.

The theory of the “corrupt state” implies that the state is the arena of corruption. Williams concludes, in Political Corruption in Africa (1987), that the centrality of the state in colonial Africa ensured that political and economic competition would focus on acquiring possession of public resources; it was almost inevitable that the competition for public office would assume corrupt forms; and that if political corruption is identified as an important feature of the post-colonial state, it is rarely a dominant one. Harsch (1993) points out that a number of writers examine corruption as an integral element in relation to political power, in which state property and jobs are allocated to ethnic or political supporters in intricate and sometimes far-reaching network of patron-client relations.

5.3 The Predatory State and the Rentier State

The argument that the African state has a predatory nature has been proposed since the 1980s. Darbon (1990) discusses the “predatory state.” Frimpong-Ansah (1991) introduces Lal’s (1986) model of the predatory state, pointing out that the Nkrumah state is, on the one hand, differentiated from Lal’s predatory state, and on the other hand, its features resemble those of Lal’s predatory state. Frimpong-Ansah uses the term “vampire state” in the title of his book symbolizing the economic decline of Ghana. The classic theory of the predatory state is evolved in Predatory Rule (1992) by Fatton. Fatton makes the analysis that the ruling class becomes predatory and uses the state to further its interests. Fatton argues that the state is an organ of dominance; and that processes of ruling class consolidation require the brutal accumulation and use the most brutal forms of state extraction, namely, “predatory rule.” But Fatton does not use the term “predatory state.” Zolberg (1992), while pointing out that the “predatory state” does not provide an adequate explanation for the state theory, uses the term “weak predatory state.” Luiz (1997) shows Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko be the quintessential predatory state.

Meanwhile, discussions concerning the “rent state,” or the “rentier state,” have also developed. Beblawi and Luciani (eds. 1987) analyze the rentier economy state in Arab countries, and propose the following four characteristics: first, there is no such thing as a pure rentier economy, second, a rentier economy relies on substantial external rent, third, only a few are engaged in the generation of the rent, and fourth, the government is the principal recipient of the external rent. Yates (1996) quotes Beblawi and Luciani’s theory of the rentier state, discusses the rentier state in Gabon and Africa in terms of Beblawi’s classification, and concludes that direct redistribution of oil rents will not
contribute to greater democracy in the rentier state, but in fact, will stultify it.

Boone (1990a) defines the notion of rent by stating, first, that it adopts the idea of income or profit generated in “non-productive” activity, and second, that the definition of rent employed gives the notion of “no-market forces” a specific meaning. Boone analyzes the making of the rentier class in Senegal, and concludes that political processes which make rentierism a dominant mode of local accumulation do not create conditions propitious for the expansion of capital in general. It is certain that the African state has a predatory and rent-seeking nature.

5.4 The Shadow State and the Warlord State

The “shadow state” is related to the informal economy. Kasfir (1983b) mentions that Uganda’s magendo (black market economy) dominates the underground economy, and that this features can also be found in Zaire and Ghana. This is the origin of the theory of the “black market state.”

Reno, focusing on the black market and the informal economy, formulates the theory of the shadow state. In Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (1995a), Reno indicates that the post-colonial institutional state is no longer the principal authority, and analyzes the rise of the “shadow state” — the emergence of rulers drawing authority from their ability to control markets and their material rewards, and concludes that informal markets are integrally linked to the exercise of political power.

Clapham (1996) supports Reno’s theory of the shadow state, pointing out that the idea is an attempt to extend the analysis of informal markets to understanding the operation of at least some African political systems, and emphasizes that one important way in which rulers used informal markets to bolster their control took the form of private deals with external companies. Englebert (1997) reviews Reno’s book, arguing that, Reno uses Bayart’s approach, but ends up drawing rather opposite conclusions, and points out that Reno rejects both state-centered and society-centered approaches to informal markets, and analyzes the compromises between the state (the colonial and the post-colonial state) and local chiefs.

Harsch (1997) notes that Reno presents a very detailed account of how the formal state and political authorities drew support from or directly tapped into informal market networks; real power and authority were being wielded through informal political and market networks, or the “shadow state” as Reno calls it. Joseph (ed. 1999) comments that Reno has applied the concept of the “shadow state” to structures based on informal markets.

On the other hand, analyzing Liberia, Reno (1995b) points out that Charles Taylor formed and ruled over a commercial network, a state of the commercial network, which was a transformation of patrimonialism. Together with the theory of the “commercial network state,” Reno also discusses the theory of the “warlord state.” Consequently, a state theory that should perhaps be termed the theory of the “commercial-warlord
alliance state” emerged. Roitman (2001), in a case study of regulatory authority in the Chad Basin, finds that these commercio-military alliances (or, military-commercial networks), and their counterparts in the bush are emergent figures of regulatory authority; that as regulators, they certainly compete with the nation-state in its capacities to extract, and concludes that new figures of power may emerge on the horizons (e.g., agents of regulatory authority in the Chad Basin) which do not destabilize our manner of thinking and exercising power.

Further, in Warlord Politics and African States (1998a), Reno provides the analysis that since the end of the Cold War, globalization has proceeded, economic patronage has been disrupted and rulers have used private syndicates, “warlords” have appeared, and the conventional weak state has turned into the warlord state. Reno defines warlordism as warlord politics dominated by warlords where the pursuit of private interests takes place through a new form of wealth creation. Reno’s theory of the “warlord state” can be understood as a variant of the theory of the “weak state.” In addition, Reno expresses warlord politics in the weak state, but does not use the term “warlord state.”

Concerning the distinction between the weak state and the warlord state, Ahluwalia (2001) surmises that the weak state ruler has few options but to resort to measures which allow for the retention of power, and that it is this which potentially leads to the warlord state.

5.5 The Class State

The approach to the African state based on the class theory has developed in many directions, from simple class analysis to a comprehensive theory of the class state. The theory of the class state emerged at the end of the 1970s. Based on Forrest’s review of the theory of the class state up to the mid-1980s in “The Contemporary African State: A ‘Ruling Class’?” (1987), the conceptual basis of the “state as class” analytic school can be summarized as follows.

Markovitz (1977) and Hill (1977) take the view that state managers are an organizational bourgeoisie (Markovitz) or public sector peasantry (Hill). Swaison (1978) points out that the domestic bourgeoisie of indigenous capitalism in post-colonial Kenya used state power for capital accumulation. Brett’s (1978) analysis is that the state controls the means of production and acts not so much as a class-in-itself as in the interests of the local capitalist class.

Bernstein (1981) analyzes the contradictions of the state-peasantry relations in Tanzania, and concludes that the African state came to be consolidated as a class which has contradictions with the peasantry and civil society. Gouffern (1982) analyzes the state and the bourgeoisie in Côte d’Ivoire. Fauré and Médard (eds. 1982) discuss whether the bourgeoisie of Côte d’Ivoire is a dominant class or a leading class. Samoff (1979, 1982) critically examines Shivji’s argument (1976) that the ruling class in Tanzania is a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, a term that could apply to many African states,
and concludes that it makes sense to speak of a bureaucratic class to identify that class as one within the ruling alliance. Samoff (1983) gives a depiction of a socially fluid and internationally influenced “bureaucratic class.” Collins (1983) discusses the relations between the growth of the indigenous bourgeoisie and the role of the state.

Callaghy (1984) offers the analysis that a political ruling class that emerges out of the patrimonial administrative state uses the state apparatus to build an economic base for itself. Currie and Ray (1984) analyze the state and class in Kenya, and accept Alavi’s formulation of the state as an arena for factional class conflicts. Stein (1985) analyzes the rise of the bureaucratic class intent on reproducing the state under a bureaucratic mode of production in Tanzania.

A further question is how to understand the relationship with international capital. Meillassoux (1970) points out that the bureaucracy does not own the means of production on a private judicial basis, but controls them on a constitutional basis; given the economic dependence of the country, the bureaucracy is itself a dependent group, and its origin as an instrument of Western interests continues to influence its development. Amin (1974) analyzes the formation of a state bourgeoisie dominated by the financial capital of the center. Shivji (1976) proposes the argument that the ruling section of the petit bourgeoisie is the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that is a dependent bourgeoisie — dependent on the international bourgeoisie. Von Freyhold (1977) makes a distinction between the ruling class in the metropolitan state and the governing class in the post-colonial state, and coins the term “Africanizer” for the local governing class that serves to strengthen the domination of the ruling class — the international bourgeoisie.

Saul (1979), while making a similar argument to Shivji, breaks with Shivji by focusing on the significance of political contestation within the petit bourgeoisie and within the established institutions. Leys (1975, 1976) argues that the state reflects the particular contours of the class struggle, and stresses that the state serves the interests of international capital. Sklar (1979) points out that disparagement of the indigenous bourgeoisie as a “comprador” class betrays a lack of appreciation for the nature of dominant-class formation in the non-industrial countries, and introduces instead the concept of the managerial bourgeoisie in non-industrial countries which has a tendency to coalesce with international bourgeoisie in foreign countries. Gordon (1986) argues, in relation to the view of the colonial state as representing the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, that there were wide variations in the relationship between metropolitan-based economic interests and those of locally-based economic interests within colonial societies of the colonial period.

Various objections, criticisms, and opinions were later put forward against the theory of the class state. Bayart (1979) proposes the theory of the ruling elite to deal with the doubts about whether a dominant class controls the means of production. Schatzberg (1980) argues that the Zairian polity may be conceived as a class system,
and proposes the concept of the “politico-commercial bourgeoisie,” or political elite, who control the state but does not control the means of production. Kasfir (1983b) insists that a Weberian state-centered and Marxian class-focused framework can be “conjoined” to better account for the mutually supportive inter-connections that bolster the power of both the state and the capitalist class. Young and Turner (1985) describe the state as being in part a reflection of class relationships within civil society; the state may be viewed as a congealed representation of class relations.

After reviewing the arguments of the “state as class” school, Forrest (1987) comes to the conclusion that the state in post-independent Africa is not a ruling class or a bourgeoisie, but rather an institutional composite of elites who hold political power. Fatton (1988) comments that the ruling class controls the state and uses the state to further their interests; class power is state power; the two are fused and inseparable.

On the other hand, Kasfir, who edited *State and Class in Africa* (1984), offers the analysis in “Class, Political Domination and the African State” (1987), that a variety of complex considerations affect the relationship between the state and class formation, and that the organization of patronage provides roots for the state in the society over which it rules, and implies that there can be no simplistic theory of the class state. Markovitz (1987) defines the ruling class as an “organizational bourgeoisie” located at pivotal points of control in systems of political, social and economic power. Beckman (1988) argues that there is a need to take seriously the domestic powerful ruling classes which are at work in support of reconstruction of the state.

Fatton (1989) describes the state as never being “soft,” as it is always an organ of dominance in African societies which are traversed by processes of ruling class consolidation, and then supports Markovitz’s view. Boone (1994) concludes that the ruling classes in post-colonial Africa were constituted through the use of state resources, “the state as a resource.” Ake (1985) examines the nature of the state as a specific modality of class domination; the state is essentially a capitalist phenomenon, and what makes the capitalist mode of production the ideal setting for the development of the state form of domination is the thoroughgoing generalization of commodity production and exchange. Ihonvbere (1989) and Ibeanu (1993) cite and support Ake’s definition.

One of the groups which developed the theory of the class state was scholars who were close to Marxism. The point of departure for the Marxist theory of the state in post-colonial societies was Alavi’s article “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh” (1972). Concerning the ruling classes in the post-colonial societies of Pakistan and Bangladesh, Alavi’s definition formulating the propertied exploiting classes as the indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisie, and the landed class, under metropolitan patronage, was considered to be widely applicable to the Third World and had an impact on the theory of the African state. Alavi points out that such a relatively autonomous role of the state apparatus is of importance to the neo-colonialist bourgeoisie.
Tordoff (2002) argues that the theory of the class state was developed by Marxist scholars and was thus based on the assumption that classes exist objectively in Africa and that class consciousness is developed for political conflict. Mohan and Zack-Williams’ co-edited *The Politics of Transition in Africa* (2004) is useful concerning the debate on the class state. The perspective from class theory is as important as ever in the theory of the African state.

### 5.6 The Developmental State

Arguments surrounding the “developmental state” have centered mainly on the issue of the state’s role in economic development. The role of the state in economic development has been crucial in African countries. Yet the IMF and the World Bank have demanded that African countries curtail the role of the state. The World Bank’s report *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* (1981), known as the Berg Report, placed the blame for the African economic crisis on inappropriate state intervention in the economy. Bates (1981) examines agricultural policies and struggles in the market place between the state and peasants in Africa. Bates’ theory provided an objective political economic basis to the structural adjustment program (SAP) and performed the important role of transforming the aid policies of international institutions toward Africa.

On the one hand, arguments defending the policies of the IMF and the World Bank were developed. Whitaker (1991) arranges the policies (the relations between development doctrine and the state precept) of the World Bank toward Africa into five iterations. Gadzey (1992) concludes that total state domination of all economic activity in many African countries has had a very disabling effect on their economic development. Clapham (1995) comments that conditionality certainly has some salutary effect, but remains skeptical about whether it can bring about the kind of transformations which it aims for. Gyimah-Boadi and van de Walle (1996) introduce the renewal program for the African economy, Agenda for Africa’s Economic Renewal of the Overseas Development Council (ODC) from the standpoint of the World Bank, and emphasize that the administrations should have development experts, and that states should adopt “developmental state” policies capable of sustaining growth-inducing policies.

It was claimed that the role of the state in economic development policy was as crucial as ever. Cheru (1989) analyzes the Berg Report and discusses the role of the state, pointing out that the real issue in Africa is not the degree to which the state intervenes in economic matters, but on whose behalf it intervenes. Ibeanu (1993) gives an introduction to Ake’s analysis of the peripheral capitalist state, looking at the role and nature of the state in peripheral capitalism. Leys (1994) criticizes the policies of the World Bank by pointing out that the African state remains a potential line of defense for Africans against the depredation of the world economic and political system, as the
drive by the IMF and the World Bank to weaken the African state in the name of market efficiency implicitly acknowledges. Tsie (1996) argues that the state should intervene in the economy to create, strengthen and complement the private sector. Ahluwalia (2001) criticizes the current situation where foreign institutions and agencies determine and dictate fundamental policies of the African state, calling them the new “colonial administrators.”

5.7 The Privatized State

Arguments concerning the privatization of the state emerged at the end of the 1990s. Adedeji (ed. 1993) mentions that the personalization and monopolization of power has led to the increasing privatization of the state in the hands of the powerful and has promoted a marginalization process which has been aggravated by the SAP. Clapham (1996) argues that the states were not functioning, so the privatization or the de-stating of international relations was proceeding. In the introduction to Privatising the State (Hibou ed. 2004, 1999), Hibou introduces case studies from Africa where state functions were privatized. Diouf (1999) discusses the volume edited by Hibou. Tangri (1999) remarks the importance of the economic role of the state in the policies of Africa’s privatization.

Musah (2002) gives an explanation of the process of the privatization of security and the process of state collapse in Africa. This discussion concerns the process of the privatization of the state where security has been entrusted to non-state actors such as warlords and private military companies (PMCs). Musah concludes that it is imperative to build the capacity and ensure the independence of the security services in order to invigorate the state. It is expected that robust examinations of the privatization of the state will be forthcoming.

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to summarize the discussions and arguments raised concerning the prospects of the African state, such as how African states deal with the issues they are facing.

Firstly, we must consider the state and human beings. Wunsch and Olowu (eds. 1990) discuss the failure of the centralized state, and claim that it is necessary for the state to be refounded as a decentralized human institution on a system of self-governance. Nyong’o (1992a, 1992b) discusses the failure of the one-party rule, and argues for popular political participation and “putting the people first” democratization. Kidane (Kidane and Daddieh eds. 1999) proposes the normal (important) notion that states are no longer likely to bring about successful state building and economic development without creating conditions for the participation of different groups in decision making.
Wunsch (2000) insists that the vast majority of Africa’s people had neither a role nor a voice in constructing the national rule-structure; re-founding the African state must resolve these problems; and that people will rule themselves better under decentralized, federal and consociational systems, a process to develop consensus. Neocosmos (2001) proposes an attempt to establish state legitimacy through the creation of a consensual state founded on an elite-driven political consensus. Political participation by the people and an emphasis on consensus are regarded as necessary for the reconstitution of the state. However, the emphasis on consensus is not a novel viewpoint. In fact, arguments concerning coalition politics in Africa’s plural society have been explored since the 1960s.

Secondly, there is the reconstruction of the African state based on African culture and values. Davidson (1992) concludes that what the analysis goes on to demand is the invention of a state appropriate for a post-imperialist future. Miles (1995) points out that in Francophone African countries, the second type of decolonization represents a regression in political development; and that this development provides the opportunity for scholars to rethink the role and the function of the state in Africa. Foltz (1995) points out that the reconstruction of the collapsed state involves putting back into place five basic elements, namely, a central political authority, control over national boundaries, control over national territory, capacity to extract resources, and control over the actions of state agents. Schedler (Schedler et al. eds. 1999) puts forward the theory of the “self-restraining state” with working systems that can provide credible restraints on power in new democracies.

Gyimah-Boadi (ed. 2004) advocates the resumption of the construction of the nation-state in many African countries, and points out that these countries have gained international prestige as “emerging states,” i.e., states that have reversed decay and are on the rebound. Martin (2002) proposes going “beyond the nation-state in Africa” on the basis of Pan-Africanism, African unity and federalism, and concludes that the “United States of Africa” is an idea whose time has come. Wa Muiu (2002) claims that Africans have to create African states that are based on their own culture and values. Cliffe (2002) concludes that Africa-focused solutions to the myriad problems facing the continent are to be found. This Pan-Africanism is at base akin to the idea for the creation of the “black African federated state” advocated by Diop (1987). There is a need for the “new paradigm of the African state” in which Africans are the main agents and which goes “beyond the nation-state.”

Thirdly, let us look at shifts in the framework of the international community. Huxtable (Villalón and Huxtable eds. 1998) explains that the nation-state will soon be replaced by a more functional political structure; the post-colonial African state was modeled on the nation-states of the First World and has been supported by the global norm that the state is the only legitimate form of political organization; and that if that norm were to collapse in the rest of the world, so too would the state in Africa; and the
African state may disintegrate, not because of the failure of Africans to adapt to the world system, but because the state itself has become inadequate for the realities of the current world system.

Clapham (1996) proposes the necessity for the issue of statelessness to be questioned in the context of international relations, pointing out that zones of statelessness have coexisted with the maintenance of an international system that was confined to relations between states; the international relations of statelessness have imposed themselves as an issue. The creation of a more flexible framework for the state and the international community is necessary for the 21st century. Clapham (2001) claims that the notion of creating states within the territorial entities prescribed by colonial rule is coming to an end, and points out that the critical turning points are likely to be willingness of the dissident elite that reject the bases of the post-colonial state. In addition, some recognition of the real as opposed to the formal bases of African statehood will need to come into being.

Fourthly, how should we deal with the collapsed state? Herbst has actively proposed measures for dealing with it. As a countermeasure to state failure in Africa, Herbst (1996) proposes, on the one hand, alternatives within the current international state system. As options for the current sovereign state, these are breaking the intellectual log-jam, reviewing the experience of the single sovereign state, demanding self-determination, providing for the possibility of secession, reducing emphasis on political boundaries, providing aid for regional integration, and recognizing new nation-states. On the other hand, Herbst proposes alternatives to the sovereign state, making international institutions more flexible, recognizing “sovereignty” for traditional leaders or warlords who exercise authority, decertifying the failed state by the international community. Herbst’s conclusion is that the current emphasis on resuscitating states that have never demonstrated the capacity to be viable is a mistake. In States and Power in Africa (2000a), Herbst mentions the response to state failure, and proposes the creation of “small-scale independent states,” following the term of Forrest (2004).

Robinson (2002) reviews States and Power in Africa and evaluates Herbst’s approach in general, but is not convinced by Herbst’s argument of the disintegration of the system of African states. Herbst (2004a) again affirms that new nation-states should be recognized. Herbst (2004b) further makes the concrete proposal that the international community should recognize Somaliland, which is functioning as a state. The situation in Somalia between 1991 and 2000, and the issue of the withdrawal of its recognition as a state in the case of Somalia is discussed by Kreijen (2004). Kreijen analyzes the Somali paradox as follows: on the one hand, Somalia must have ceased to be a state because it lacks a government, but on the other hand, its state extinction has not occurred because of the recognition by the international community. Somalia is said to be a resemblance to a case of clinical death.
Herbst’s proposals are important, but their acceptance is cautious. Spears (2004) reviews debates on the secession and the recognition of new states in Africa, and proposes the consideration of appropriate and carefully calibrated alternative solutions. Osaghae (2006) proposes the reconstitution of the state with positive ethnicity as the primary consideration in partnerships between the state and ethnic groups. However, it is possible that the reality rather than the theory will take the lead in this matter. In a Herbst-like manner of speaking, it is perhaps a “challenge to the practice” rather than a “challenge to the theory.” In connection with this issue, Roitman (2001) argues that new figures of a non-state regulatory authority, a military-commercial complex, have emerged in the Chad Basin, which poses a question concerning how to understand sovereignty in non-state powers.

Forrest (2004) analyzes the trend toward subnationalist autonomy and the expansion of ethnic subnationalism and points to the intercommunity and interethnic alliances that underpin successful movements. In contrast to the assertion of Clapham’s shared-political-authority model (which is marked by shared authority between different localities in which local rulers are accorded a high level autonomy in exchange for recognition of the ultimate authority of a national ruler), Forrest argues that a localism-in-polity political order (based on inter-ethnic cooperation and alliance building), alliance-based set of polities will eventually emerge. Concerning the notion of the consociational macro-federal system, or polycultural federations, Forrest comments that it is no helpful to put forth exact models based on ideal types of governing arrangements.

Osaghae (2006) emphasizes the positive aspects of ethnicity, that is, “positive ethnicity,” which utilizes ethnicity in state projects, and advocates the formation of new partnerships between the state and ethnic groups. This is an epoch-making proposal. The response to the collapsed state is not the establishment of arbitrary, non-peaceful, and inhumane states. African states must be states of the African people, by the African people, and for the African people. That is the fundamental premise.

Fifthly, there is the alteration of national borders. Ravenhill (1988) suggests that disparities between de facto and de jure boundaries can be expected to increase as growing conflicts serves primarily to exacerbate the trend toward state disintegration, and examines how the map of Africa is being redrawn. Englebert (2000) quotes Deng’s statement that “borders are not sacred” and proposes that, since the reshuffling of African boundaries has begun in many parts of Africa, there be a rethinking of the principle of Uti Possidetis (African states commit to honor the borders they had inherited from colonization). The discussion on national borders continues. For example, Larémont (2005) examines federalism as an option, and concludes that the borders of the African state are being reformed on a de facto basis by warfare. Mazrui (2005) asserts the necessity to redraw Africa’s borders, and for example, suggests concretely a radical solution of the federation of Rwanda and Burundi with Tanzania in order to
liberate them from genocide.

Sixthly, there is the rejection of re-colonization. Gebe (1996), while criticizing the proposal of Mazrui that regional powers manage weak states as an argument for a programmed re-colonization, points out that re-colonization of any kind is not acceptable; neither will it be politically sound to re-demarcate existing African state boundaries. Kownacki (1998) introduces arguments of the school of forced intervention (or, as its critics would have it, the continent’s re-colonization), claiming that any reform of the state apparatus and securing its efficiency must be forced by foreign engagement for the solution of African problems, or in other words, the re-colonization of the continent. Further, there is the issue of the trusteeship system. Osinbajo (1996) argues that Somalia became a UNOSOM-run institution (a quasi-trusteeship state) due to the stationing of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), but that the quasi-trusteeship operation of the UN consequently failed. The theory of re-colonization is anachronistic.

Finally, I would like to mention the basic attitude and method of study on African politics. Concretely, proposals have been made to move away from the conventional attitude that concepts of Western political science are naturally applicable to Africa, and to adhere to an attitude that contributes to the development of Africa.

Jinadu (2000) argues that with the globalization of Western political science, research on Africa is being turned into a “laboratory” to test whether concepts of Western political science are applicable, but Africa must be studied in terms of the conditions and possibilities for its own self-centered development. Ahluwalia (2001) criticizes past theories of the African state as being exogenous ones, advocates that this position now be cast off, and proposes that the African state be analyzed from endogenous dimensions. Ahluwalia concludes that Eurocentric theory has failed to understand post-colonial Africa; Africa and Africans transform and inflect the institutions inherited as a result of colonialism. A discussion critical of the methodology of Western research on Africa has been raised (Van Hoyweghen and Smis 2002), which points out that there is no universal model of political evolution, and it is necessary that definitions and models of the state be examined critically.

In other words, there is a strong demand for the Eurocentric viewpoint to be shaken off, for a directionality that contributes to the development of Africa to be clarified, and for an attitude to be maintained that creates valid concepts for the analysis of the reality in African politics.
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